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Book Reviews

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The Journal of SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Roger Pearson
General Editor
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The New Middle East: The Gulf Monarchies and Israel

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The recent war in Iraq will have long-range strategic ramifications on the Middle East. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime the Bush administration introduced the so-called road map, which seeks to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians. These political developments underscore the connection between the geo-politics of the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This study examines the Gulf monarchies' policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Particular attention is given to the Saudi leading role in the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the Saudi peace plans of 1981 and 2002. Finally, the study discusses the limited diplomatic relations between Israel and two Gulf monarchies (Oman and Qatar).

Key Words: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, America, Oman, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Gulf monarchy, oil, water technology, Jew, Arab, Zionism, Muslim, Cold War, communist, Wahhabis.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established through an alliance between the Saudi dynasty and religious zealots known as Muwahhiduns, Unitarians, or Wahhabis. This alliance was forged in the early eighteenth century and has persisted until today. In formulating their stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Saudi policy-makers have tried to accommodate pressures from opposite directions. First, the kingdom holds approximately one-fourth of world's proven oil reserves and is the world's largest oil producer and exporter. Little wonder, the Arabs have long debated the use of this strategic commodity in their struggle against Israel and its major ally: the United States. With one significant exception – the Arab oil embargo that followed the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war – Saudi leaders have adamantly resisted mixing oil and policy.

Second, since its creation as a nation state in 1932, Saudi Arabia has confronted serious threats from more populous and powerful regional states such as Nasser of Egypt, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Given the kingdom's limited military capability, in comparison with these three regional powers, Riyadh was not able to

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defend itself. Instead, a major component of the country's security strategy has been a reliance on the United States. Considering Saudi Arabia's massive oil resources and its prominent role in global energy markets, Washington has always demonstrated firm commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia. This close strategic cooperation between Washington and Riyadh has always been a major source of tension and embarrassment for the Saudi royal family in both the Arab and Islamic worlds. Right to the point, the dilemma facing the Saudi policy-makers has been how to explain their close cooperation with the United States, Israel's closest ally.

The massive hydrocarbon wealth, the strong religious legitimacy of the Saudi regime and the close cooperation with the United States have all shaped the kingdom's approach to the Middle East conflict. Four basic characteristics of the Saudi stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute can be identified. First, during the Cold War, Saudi officials sought to underscore the early association between Zionism and the socialist ideology and the communist political backing it received in the initial stages of Israel's creation.[2] Furthermore, the Saudis claimed that Israel was largely responsible for the entry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East. They argued that Israel's military victory in the 1948 war substantially contributed to the collapse of conservative governments and the rise of radical forms of Pan-Arabism in several key Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In addition, the displaced Palestinians became a radicalizing force in Arab politics. This political environment, the argument goes, facilitated Soviet penetration of the Middle East and put pro-Western regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, on the defensive. Second, Saudi attitude toward Israel is also shaped by religious and cultural factors. Most Arab and Muslim countries hosted large Jewish communities prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948. Relations between the predominantly Muslim populations and these Jewish minorities were not always easy, but the idea of Jews living alongside Muslims was not unknown. For the Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies, however, Jews were almost totally foreign. No significant Jewish community existed in

[2] Bahgat Korany, "Defending the Faith: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia", in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984, pp.241-282, p.250.

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the Arabian Peninsula outside of Yemen in modern times.[3] Many Saudis, and other Arabs, have failed to see any distinction between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a religious political movement.

Third, the Israeli control over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem since the 1967 war has further intensified the Saudi hostility toward the Jewish state. As the guardians of the two holiest places in Islam – Mecca and Medina – the Saudis could not be indifferent to the third most sacred place in Islam, the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Finally, the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab and Muslim policies as well as the presence of large Palestinian expatriate communities in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies have shaped the kingdom's relations with the Palestinians. Generally, Riyadh has enjoyed good relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yassir Arafat. Occasionally, the relations between the two sides were tense due to leftist and secular nationalist tendencies within the PLO and the Saudi support to rival Palestinian organizations such as Hamas. Arafat's support to Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War (1991) dealt a heavy blow to ties between the PLO and Saudi and other Gulf monarchies. Despite these periodical but significant setbacks, the Saudis have demonstrated strong commitment to the Palestinian cause. Like other Arabs, the Saudis believe that the creation of a Palestinian state with real authority and sovereignty is the right way to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and contain nationalist and Islamist radicalism in the region.

In the following sections the Saudi policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be analyzed. Particular attention is given to the Saudi leading role in the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Saudi peace plans of 1981 and 2002, and the kingdom's diplomatic and financial role in supporting the Palestinians and other Arab states in both launching wars and making peace with Israel. Finally, the study discusses the limited diplomatic relations between Israel and two Gulf monarchies (Oman and Qatar). In September 1994 the six Gulf monarchies agreed to lift the secondary and tertiary boycott on direct dealings with Israeli companies until peaceful negotiations are successfully concluded between Israel on one side and

[3] William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil*, Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1981, p.31.

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Syria and Lebanon on the other side. The Gulf monarchies do not adopt an identical approach toward the Jewish state. Diplomatic contacts and trade relations have been established between Jerusalem and both Muscat and Doha.

The analysis suggests that the strained opposition to Israel and the, generally, moderating role the Gulf monarchies play in the Arab-Israeli conflict can be explained by their close strategic relations with the United States. In addition to Washington's pressure on the Gulf monarchies to adopt a moderate stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict, domestic opposition pulls them to the opposite direction, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Given the characteristics of the Saudi internal policy as well as the kingdom's prominent role in the Arab and Islamic worlds, Riyadh is likely to be among the latest Arab states to normalize relations with Israel if a comprehensive peace agreement is reached.

Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In 1932 Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud declared the creation of modern-day Saudi Arabia and pronounced himself a king. For several years thereafter he was busy consolidating his grasp on power and expanding the frontiers of the new state. Indeed, it took Riyadh several decades to finalize border agreements with its neighbors. Thus, the emergence of a distinctive Saudi foreign policy was slow and reflected the kingdom's expanding needs to play a role on the international scene. A significant development in this direction was the meeting held between the Saudi King Ibn Saud and the American President Franklin Roosevelt in 1945. In addition to discussing bilateral relations, President Roosevelt made two promises to King Ibn Saud. A) He would never do anything, which might prove hostile to the Arabs; B) The U.S. government would make no change in its basic policy on Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs. These two promises underscore the Saudis' perception of their country's leading role in Arab affairs; mistrust of a growing Jewish immigration to, then, Palestine, which eventually led to the creation of Israel; the centrality of Palestinian question in Arab policy, and their favorite method to contain the perceived Jewish threat in the region – dependence on the United States.

Put differently, the Saudis, like the majority of Arabs, resented the

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creation of a Jewish state at the heart of the Arab world. The kingdom, however, adopted a different approach from that chosen by secular leftist-nationalist Arab regimes such as Egypt, Syria, and later Iraq. Instead of relying on the Soviet Union in the struggle against Israel, Saudi Arabia sought to lobby Western countries, particularly the United States, to exert pressure on the Jewish state. This was in line with a Saudi perception that atheistic communism was a greater threat to the Muslims and Arabs than Zionism. The repeated Arab defeats, the miserable plight of the Palestinian people, and Israel's control of Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites have further deepened the Saudi resentment to Israel.

To sum up, the Saudi stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the Israeli occupation of Arab land is the major reason for instability in the Middle East. A just and comprehensive solution to the conflict cannot be achieved unless Israel withdraws from the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, including, first and foremost, the eastern part of Jerusalem, where holy Muslim sites are located. In addition, an independent and sovereign Palestinian state should be established and a fair settlement to the Palestinian refugees should be reached. In pursuing these goals Riyadh has employed economic, financial, and diplomatic methods. These include participating in the Arab economic boycott against Israel, voting in the United Nations and other international organizations against the Jewish state, giving substantial financial aid to the Palestinians and other Arabs in their struggle against Israel, and proposing their own initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Unlike other Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was slow. Despite the kingdom's animosity toward Israel, the Saudi leaders were more concerned about the Soviet penetration of the Middle East and the alliance Moscow forged with Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad than with the threat posed by Zionism. For most of the 1950s and 1960s the former was seen as a national security issue, where the survival of the regime was at stake, while the latter was viewed as a foreign policy concern, albeit a significant one. Indeed, during this period Riyadh was accused of helping Israel indirectly by allying itself with the United States, the major supporter of the Jewish state. The kingdom sent token military units to Jordan in the 1948 war, but these units were not in-

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volved in hostilities. In the 1956 war Saudi Arabia lost two small-unpopulated islands to Israel. These two islands, Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance of the Straits of Tiran, had been lent to Egypt in the context of the Arab Collective Security Pact. Saudi Arabia quietly recovered these islands following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979.[4]

The 1967 war was a turning point in Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following this war the kingdom has resumed a leading role in drawing Arab strategy toward Israel. Two major developments explain this drastic change. First, as part of the stunning Arab defeat, Israel captured the eastern part of Jerusalem and united the entire city under Israeli sovereignty and pronounced it its eternal capital. In other words, al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest Islamic shrine after Mecca and Medina was no longer under Muslim/Arab control. The kingdom, which is the birthplace of Islam, could not afford to be indifferent to this new situation. King Faisal, then in power, did pray in al-Aqsa mosque several years earlier and expressed his strong desire to revisit the holy site when Muslim sovereignty is restored. A wish that had never been realized.

The second important outcome of the 1967 war was the defeat of radical Arab nationalism led by President Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt. In the period prior to the war the Arab world was sharply divided into two camps: the pro-Western conservative regimes and radical, socialist-nationalist states. This Arab cold war reached its peak in the proxy war between Egyptian and Saudi armies in Yemen, where the two states supported opposite sides. Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war ended its involvement in the Yemeni conflict. Cairo became more concerned about liberating the territories it lost to Israel than supporting Arab revolutionary movements. Equally important, the heavy military defeat and the loss of Suez Canal revenues dealt a heavy blow to the Egyptian economy. Egypt became increasingly dependent on foreign aid from Arab oil producing countries.

The Khartoum conference, convened in September 1967, was the first Arab summit to be held after the June 1967 war. The meeting dem-

[4] Hermann Frederick Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy", in L. Carl Brown (ed), *Diplomacy in the Middle East*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001, pp.219-244, p.229.

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onstrated the growing role Saudi Arabia came to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It officially ended the estrangement between the radical and conservative Arab states. The more confident Saudi leadership reached out to the badly weakened Egypt. Two resolutions adopted by the participant heads of states deserve special attention. First, the Arab leaders agreed to unite their political efforts on the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the war and to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab lands. The main principles that shaped the Arab stand were no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel as well as adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.[5] Second, King Faisal took the initiative to offer substantial financial subsidy to the confrontational states. The king persuaded Kuwait and Libya, two conservative oil-producing countries, to join in that effort. The goal was to compensate the confrontational states from the losses of land and revenue resulting from the war.

These resolutions underscored some of the main constant characteristics of the Saudi Arabia's stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A) The kingdom would not recognize the state of Israel as long as the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem are under Israeli control. B) Despite the strong rejection of any negotiation with Israel, diplomatic and political efforts were not ruled out. Military force was not considered as the exclusive method to liberate the occupied Arab territories. C) The Saudi role was mainly, if not exclusively, to provide financial support to the confrontational states and the Palestinians. These financial resources have been utilized to strengthen moderation and pro-Western Arab regimes and to weaken extremism and radical Palestinian groups and Arab states. D) Finally, a direct Saudi role in the military confrontation with Israel was not considered. The kingdom has never been an Arab front-line state. There has never been direct military confrontation with Israel.

The rapprochement between Riyadh and Cairo was further enhanced in 1971, when Anwar al-Sadat assumed the presidency after Nasser's death. During the almost two decades that he dominated the Arab policy, Nasser opened the door for Soviet penetration of the Mid-

[5] Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, (eds), *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations 1948-Present*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p.222.

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dle East and attacked Saudi strategy and interest. In contrast, Sadat from the outset of his rule showed signs of opening to work with the United States, distancing Egypt from the Soviet Union, and allying with Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states. Little wonder, King Faisal sought to de-radicalize Egypt by pressing Sadat to get rid of the thousands of Soviet advisors, who were invited by his predecessor Nasser. By eliminating the Soviet civilian and military presence in Egypt, King Faisal was hoping to convince the United States to adopt a balanced stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Faisal argued that if Egypt were to loosen its connection with the Soviet Union, the United States would be more willing to press Israel for a favorable settlement. Sadat agreed, and, shortly after he became president, Soviet advisors were ordered to leave Egypt.

King Faisal tried to press the United States to reciprocate by adopting a more evenhanded attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and not to allow this opportunity to slip by. The king argued that justifying American support of Israel by reference to the Soviet presence in Egypt was no longer a valid stance; on the contrary, continued American support for post-1967 war Israel would be interpreted by Arab states as aggression by proxy.[6] The Arabs, the argument goes, would be further alienated from the United States and the Saudi government would be placed in an untenable position.

To the dismay of the Saudi rulers, however, Washington did not alter its basic approach to the Middle East. As it became apparent that the United States was not about to deliver on its presumed promise after Sadat had altogether expelled the Soviets, Faisal felt personally deceived and embarrassed before Sadat. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's earlier moderation and insistence on the utilization of diplomatic means was gradually replaced by a belief that only through the use of military force and economic coercion Arabs can liberate the territories they lost to Israel in the 1967 war. This belief set the stage for the 1973 war and the employment of oil as a political weapon by Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing countries.

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[6] Adeed Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Ups and Downs of Pragmatic Moderation", *International Journal*, Vol.38, No.4, Fall 1983, pp. 674-689, p. 677.

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In the early 1970s Saudi Arabia increasingly placed its weight behind enhancing the Egyptian and Syrian military capabilities. An Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi triangle was forged where the three countries held periodical consultations on strategic and military issues. Indeed, King Faisal was one of very few leaders who was informed in advance about the Egyptian and Syrian plan for the Yom Kippur war of 1973. This coordination between the Saudi financial muscle and the Egyptian and Syrian military forces produced one of the most successful military campaigns the Arabs have ever launched against Israel. In addition to the initial military success, the kingdom led other Arab oil-producers in imposing oil embargo on the United States and few other countries for their support to Israel.

Oil as a Political Weapon

With relatively small population that for a long time lacked adequate military traditions, Saudi Arabia has never presented itself as a military adversary to Israel and its contribution to Arab armies in the series of Arab-Israeli wars has been, understandably, symbolic. The main asset the kingdom has are its massive hydrocarbon resources. With approximately 25 percent of total world oil reserves Saudi Arabia is the global oil superpower. Given these substantial resources as well as the fact that the global economy runs on oil, many Arabs have called for the employment of this strategic commodity in their struggle against Israel and the main Western powers that support it. Already in 1946, at a conference in Bludan (Syria), the Arab League threatened to use oil as a weapon in its struggle against the Zionist program.[7]

The subsequent Arab-Israeli wars have further intensified the debate over using oil as a political weapon. Thus, in the 1956 war and the 1967 war limited embargoes were implemented with little effect. In 1956, the United States was able to compensate for the embargo against Britain and France from its own domestic production. In 1967, Saudi government ordered Aramco to stop oil supplies to the United States and the United Kingdom even though the kingdom had been fighting Egypt by proxy in Yemen for years. This embargo lasted for only four

[7] George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1990, p.135.

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weeks and was intended primarily as a show of solidarity with fellow Arab states and to appease outraged Saudi and Arab public opinion, which ascribed the stunning Israeli military success to U.S. complicity. Meanwhile, Riyadh continued to ship jet fuel to U.S. forces in Vietnam. A major reason for this half-hearted and hesitant implementation of oil embargo in 1967 was the Saudi leaders' conviction that oil should not be mixed with policy. Rather, the Saudi leaders preferred to use oil as a "positive weapon" to build up the military and economic strength of the Arab world. Accordingly, the 1967 oil embargo had little impact and was largely ineffective.

In the aftermath of the 1967 war several developments had drastically altered the environment under which the 1973 oil embargo was initiated and implemented. Internally, Saudi Arabia gradually expanded its control over Aramco, the main oil company in charge of exploring and developing Saudi oil. In 1973, the Saudi government took a 25 percent stake in Aramco. A year later, this share was increased to 60 percent and in 1980 it was amicably agreed that Aramco should become 100 percent Saudi-owned, with the date of ownership back-dated to 1976. Prior to this Saudi take-over of Aramco the authorities in Riyadh had repeatedly sought Aramco's parent companies' aid to lobby the United States administration on the Arab-Israeli conflict. These efforts were not successful. The nationalization of Aramco made the Saudi government the determinant of its oil policies. Regionally, Sadat's assumption of the presidency in Egypt consolidated the rapprochement between Cairo and Riyadh, which started shortly after the 1967 war. The Arab world, dominated by Cairo-Damascus-Riyadh axis, was very different from the polarization that characterized Arab policy in the 1960s. Internationally, in 1973 Western dependency on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf reached one of the highest points. The global oil market was essentially a seller's market. The combined impact of these developments created the appropriate conditions to make the 1973 oil embargo an effective one.

As already mentioned after expelling the Soviet advisors from Egypt, King Faisal tried unsuccessfully to press the United States to adopt a balanced stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and to use its leverage on Israel to relinquish its occupation of Arab lands. The lack of progress on the diplomatic path convinced the Egyptian president that

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the military option was the only way to break the diplomatic stalemate. Sadat coordinated his military plans with President Assad of Syria and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, whom he visited shortly before hostilities broke out. Faisal endorsed the Egyptian/Syrian decision to go to war and promised to weigh in by using the oil weapon.

On October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a coordinated attack on Israeli positions across the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. This was the first time that Arabs managed to mount a surprise attack on Israel. Thus, initially the Egyptians and Syrians enjoyed strategic and military advantages and were able to inflict substantial losses on Israel's military capabilities in terms of both personnel and equipment. For the first few days of the fighting Israel was losing the war.

In response to these Israeli losses and Arab advances the United States decided to move decisively to change the course of the war. On the fourth day of the war President Nixon ordered a massive airlift of American arms to Israel. Within a few days the United States was providing Israel with a thousand tons of war material a day. All in all, Israel received a total of more than 22,000 tons of equipment including forty F-4 Phantoms, thirty-eight A-4 Sky-hawks, twelve C-I30 transports, twenty tanks, spare parts, and ammunition.[8] In addition to these military supplies President Nixon requested Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel, including $1.5 billion in outright grants.

This massive American aid to Israel outraged the Arab public opinion and put unbearable pressure on the Arab oil-producers to employ the oil weapon against the United States. Thus, few days after the Yom Kippur war started Kuwait called for a conference of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to determine the Arab response to American support to Israel. The participants in the conference agree to reduce their oil production by at least 5 percent from their average September output and to make further cuts of 5 percent every month thereafter until a total evacuation of Israelis forces from Arab territories is completed and the legitimate rights of the Pal-

[8] Ibid, p.130.

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estinians are restored.[9] States that supported the Arabs actively or took significant steps to pressure Israel to withdraw would be exempted from the cuts and would receive their full supply based on September imports.[10]

This progressive cut in oil production resulted in a sharp reduction in oil supplies in the global markets. By December 1973, Saudi oil production had fallen by 30 percent from its level before the October war. Simultaneously, the price of oil was abruptly and considerably increased from $2.83 in 1973 to an average of $10.41 in 1974.[11] This massive increase in the price of oil was an unintended result of the embargo and resulted in substantial increase in Saudi Arabia's oil revenues. In a matter of few months the kingdom became one of the richest countries in the world. Consequently, Riyadh occupied a central stage on the international scene and played a significant role in the global economy. Furthermore, Saudi leaders used their financial muscle to strengthen their position on regional issues particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1974 King Faisal took the initiative to establish an annual contribution of $2.5 billion from the oil rich countries to the "confrontation states" and the PLO. Little wonder, since 1973 most of the decisions related to this conflict were made in consultation with Riyadh.

American response to this unprecedented oil embargo ranged from peaceful appeals to lift the embargo to threats to use military force to occupy oil fields in the Persian Gulf. One month after the embargo was imposed Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state, visited Riyadh and tried to convince the Saudi leaders to resume oil shipments. His plea proved of no avail. Few weeks later, Kissinger publicly threatened that the United States would not rule out the use of military force to secure oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. Similar threats were made by Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. President Nixon sent letter to King Faisal pledging his total commitment to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict based on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and

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[9] The conference included representatives of Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, ,

[10] Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p.157.

[11] The British Petroleum, *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, London, 2003, p.14.

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338, both establishing the principle of exchange of territory for peace.

These American appeals combined with heavy Egyptian lobbying as well as some progress on separation of Israeli and Arab troops eventually convinced the Saudi leadership to lift the embargo. Initially Saudi position was that the oil embargo should not be lifted until Israel withdrew from the territories occupied in 1967 war. Later, Saudi Arabia and other oil producers gradually mollified their attitude by demanding that at least a beginning of Israeli withdrawal should take place. At the end, it was the successful conclusion of the disengagement agreements between Israel and both Egypt and Syria that led to the resumption of oil shipments. In January 1974 the United States brokered a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. President Sadat tried to encourage an Arab consensus to end the oil sanctions but King Faisal declined to lift the oil embargo until a similar Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement is reached. When the latter was accomplished in mid 1974, all restrictions on oil export were removed.

The use of oil as a political weapon during and in the aftermath of Yom Kippur war has had fundamental impact on the Saudi domestic and foreign policies. In the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s the Saudi government enjoyed unprecedented wealth, which enabled it to embark on an ambitious social and economic development. Riyadh rose to a new position of prominence in the Arab world. Due to its massive financial resources, Saudi Arabia has become a central player in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The embargo brought the kingdom into a confrontation with its closest international ally – the United States. This confrontation probably was the biggest setback in the Saudi-American relations until the terrorist attacks in September 2001.

Saudi Arabia and the Peace Process

Saudi Arabia's approach toward Israel can be described as cautious acceptance. On one side, Riyadh participated, in a symbolic way, in some of the fighting against Israel; endorsed the "no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition" resolutions of the Khartoum Summit in 1967; supported the Palestinian struggle against Israel; and gave billions of dollars to the front-line states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). On

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the other side, since the mid-1970s Saudi Arabia has backed American-brokered peace negotiations; allied itself with Arab states and leaders who advocated a peaceful settlement with Israel such as Sadat of Egypt and Hussein of Jordan and opposed those who called for the destruction of Israel like Hussein of Iraq and Qadafi of Libya. Moreover, periodically the kingdom has hosted delegations of prominent American Jews in efforts to explain its position on Arab-Israeli issues and to improve its image in the United States. Finally, Saudi leaders openly sponsored two "peace plans" with Israel. The first one was introduced by, the then, Crown Prince Fahd in 1981 and the other one was initiated by Crown Prince Abdullah in 2002. The provisions of the two plans explicitly include a conditional recognition of Israel. These apparent Saudi policies suggest that since the mid-1970s the kingdom has been willing to recognize Israel without breaking Arab ranks.

In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war two characteristics shaped the Middle East conflict. First, given the military balance of power between Israel on one side and its Arab adversaries on the other side as well as the strong and unquestionable American commitment to the security of Israel, the Arab strategic goal was very limited. The Egyptian and Syrian objectives were not to try to threaten or challenge the mere existence of Israel. Rather, the goal was to achieve a limited military victory that would break the diplomatic stalemate that dominated the region following the 1967 war. This goal was partially achieved. However, the diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict went nowhere. By the mid-1970s it became clear that the outcome of the Yom Kippur war did not create the right conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough. Second, Saudi Arabia increasingly emerged as the main power-broker in inter-Arab policy. The accumulation of unprecedented wealth enabled the kingdom to occupy a central stage on the Middle East and the international scenes.

Frustrated with the fruitless efforts to reach a comprehensive peace President Sadat decided to embark on a unilateral path to end the conflict with Israel. In November 1977 the Egyptian president announced his intention to visit Jerusalem and address the Israeli Knesset. This announcement was disturbing to the Saudi leadership for three reasons. A) Since Sadat's rise to the presidency Saudi leaders had cemented

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strong economic, political, and even personal relations with their Egyptian counterparts. Riyadh provided Cairo with billions of dollars in military and economic aid. Nevertheless, Sadat failed to consult with the Saudi leaders regarding his new strategy. Indeed, shortly before announcing his decision to go to Israel Sadat visited the kingdom but kept his hosts in the dark. B) Sadat's initiative sharply shattered the near Arab consensus, which the Saudis had worked very hard to create and maintain. Sadat's move was immediately and vehemently denounced by Syria, the PLO and even Jordan. Other Arab parties—notably Iraq, Libya, and Algeria expressed similar fiery opposition. C) The United States strongly welcomed and supported Sadat's initiative. Indeed, a proposed peace negotiation between Egypt and Israel would create a firm partnership between Cairo and Washington and would eliminate any opportunity for the Soviet influence to return to Egypt. This is exactly what the Saudis had sought to achieve since the mid-1950s.

Confronted with this sharp polarization of the Arab world Riyadh had to take into consideration several factors in formulating its stand on the Egyptian move. The Saudis did not wish to further antagonize the radical Arab states that might facilitate and deepen Soviet penetration of the Middle East. At the same time the kingdom did not want to break ranks with Egypt, the most populous Arab country. Finally, Saudi Arabia did not wish to place itself on the opposite side to its main international ally, the United States. Given these contradictory considerations, the Saudi leadership adopted a vague low-key position. Instead of clearly allying itself with one side or the other, the Saudis initially choose a wait-and-see approach.

This uncommitted stand was demonstrated in the kingdom's response to Camp David accords signed by Egypt, Israel and the United States. After intense negotiations that lasted almost two weeks Sadat, Begin, and Carter endorsed two documents. The first one spelled out nearly all the elements of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty based on the return of all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, security arrangements, and provisions for normalization of relations. The other document outlined a framework for promoting a settlement of the Palestinian question. Essentially this framework was vague and deferred the main issues of contention to negotiations on the "final status".

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The official Saudi reaction to Camp David accords was phrased in such a way that it could be read by the radicals as condemnation of Sadat, and by Egypt and the U.S. as an expression of understanding for Sadat's efforts. On the one hand, Riyadh declared that Camp David accords cannot be considered a final formula for peace because they did not state Israel's intention to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967; failed to stipulate the right of the Palestinians to an independent states; and ignored the role of the PLO. On the other hand, the kingdom asserted that it has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country nor to dispute its right to restore its occupied territory by armed struggle or through peaceful efforts, provided that does not violate Arab consensus.[12]

This mild and uncommitted Saudi stand did not satisfy Egypt's opponents, who called for an Arab summit, held in Baghdad in November 1978, to formulate Arabs' response to Camp David accords. By the time the Baghdad summit convened the Saudis were under heavy pressure from other Arab countries to participate and endorse a strong Arab rejection of Sadat's move. Still, hoping for an Arab reconciliation the Saudis sought to fight for an opportunity for Egypt to reconsider its course. Under heavy Saudi pressure, the summit rejected the calls for immediate sanctions against Egypt and condemnation of the United States. Instead, it decided not to endorse the Camp David accords and to appeal to Sadat to renounce his signature. A mission was to go to Cairo to try to persuade the Egyptian president to return to the fold and join an all-Arab strategy, and to inform him that the summit was prepared to place a vast fund of up to $9 billion at the disposal of the confrontation countries to continue the struggle, $5 billion of which would be earmarked for Egypt. Finally, the participants decided to expel Egypt from the Arab League if it signs a peace treaty with Israel.[13]

Few months after the Baghdad summit an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was officially signed – the first ever between Israel and an Arab state. This successful conclusion of Sadat's strategy of pursuing a unilat-

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[12] Jacob Goldberg, "Saudi Arabia and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process, 1977-1981", *Middle East Review*, Vol.18, No.4, Summer 1986, pp.25-33, p.28.

[13] Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p.263.

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eral peace with Israel intensified the pressure on the Saudi leaders to clarify where they stood. The time for a luxury low-profile approach was over. Riyadh had to choose either to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace plan, sponsored by the United States or join the bulk of Arab states led by the emerging axis of Iraq, Syria, and the PLO. This moment of choice came when an Arab meeting at ministerial level was held in Baghdad to give a final approval for the sanctions on Egypt, which Arab heads of states agreed on following the signing of Camp David accords. After intense negotiations Riyadh decided to join the radical Arab states in imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Egypt. Thus the majority of Arab states agreed on the immediate withdrawal of Arab ambassadors from Cairo; the severance of political and diplomatic relations; and the cessation of all financial and technical aid.

A major reason for the Saudi decision to take the opposite side of Egypt, the most populous Arab state, and the United States, the kingdom closest international ally was the developments in Iran. The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty occurred almost simultaneously with the Iranian revolution. One lesson the Saudis learned from the ousting of the Shah of Iran was that the United States had failed to protect one of its closest allies from internal opposition. The Saudi public was strongly against any peace adventure with Israel and the Saudi leaders did not want the experience of the Shah to be repeated in their country. Furthermore, the fall of the Phalavi regime and the chaos that accompanied and followed it meant that Iraq has become a more powerful force in the region. The idea of antagonizing the emerging powerful Baghdad did not appeal to the Saudis. This was further reinforced by the close cooperation between Iraq, Syria, and the PLO. In other words, Riyadh's vulnerability dictated that it follows the Arab consensus, thereby decreasing its exposure to internal and external subversion by radical Arabs and the new threat posed by the Iranian revolution.

Despite the kingdom's endorsement of and participation in the diplomatic and economic sanctions on Egypt, the Saudi leaders have never been enthusiastic about a complete isolation of Egypt. They did not want to entirely sabotage their close ties with Cairo. Thus, the flow of remittances to Egypt from Egyptian nationals working in the kingdom was allowed to continue unabated and low level contacts with Egyptian

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officials were maintained. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the creation of new alliances in the Middle East drastically altered the strategic dynamics in the region. The Iraq-Syria, PLO axis was broken and the importance of Egypt as a major regional power was felt. More contacts with Egypt were established and by 1987 diplomatic ties between Cairo and Riyadh were officially resumed.

To sum up, the Saudi opposition to the Egyptian efforts to negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Israel should not be seen as a Saudi rejection of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, the Saudis, like other Arabs, refused the unilateral approach Sadat had adopted and preferred a comprehensive agreement that would guarantee Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the realization of Palestinian rights. The Saudis wanted to contain the polarization of the Arab world. Little wonder, the Saudis formulated their own peace plans. In 1981 and 2002 the kingdom presented its own vision of a peaceful end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Fahd Plan:

The Camp David Accords of 1978 and subsequent Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 were considered a disaster for the Saudis. They believed President Sadat was seduced into a separate peace with Israel in return for vague and unspecified promises of Palestinian autonomy. The unsuccessful negotiations on the issue of Palestinian national rights played at the hands of radical Arabs and further deepened the division within the Arab world. In the early 1980s the Arab world was sharply polarized into the handful of countries, which supported Egypt and the majority who opposed it. This polarization shattered the hope of Arab consensus which the Saudis had worked hard to create. Furthermore, the position of moderate Arab states, the allies of the United States, which engineered and sponsored the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, became increasingly untenable. Under these conditions the Saudis felt the need to change the course of Arab policy from isolating and punishing Egypt, which would further strengthen the radical Arabs, to presenting a positive alternative to Sadat's strategy of a separate peace with Israel. This Saudi proposal was announced in 1981 and became known as the Fahd Plan.

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In addition to Riyadh's desire to overcome the deep division in the Arab world, several other developments encouraged the Saudis to formulate and pursue their own vision of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A) The deadlock in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation regarding the Palestinian national rights. For many Arabs these negotiations looked as an endless succession of Egyptian concessions, matched by increasing Israeli demands and conditions. B) Unlike President Carter who played a crucial role in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that led to the signing of Camp David accords and the peace treaty, President Reagan was less committed to the path of making peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. C) On October 6, 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by Muslim fanatics in the midst of a parade celebrating the anniversary of the Yom Kippur war. This violent removal of the architect of the Egyptian peace process raised strong doubt as to the validity of this unilateral course to make peace with Israel. It also made the Saudi proposal for a comprehensive agreement more relevant.

The Fahd Plan consisted of eight points, which together represented a framework for a "just peace". The provisions of this plan called for Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war and to dismantle settlements. The proposal also demanded the creation of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and a guarantee of the right of Palestinian refuges to return to their homes or be compensated. The most striking part of the plan was an implicit recognition of Israel by confirming that all states in the region have the right to live in peace. This was a fundamental departure from traditional Saudi policy. Equally important, the plan marked Saudi Arabia's first public attempt to play an active leading role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The reaction to the plan varied from one state to another. The Reagan administration described the proposal as a positive step. Israeli leaders acknowledged that the Saudi readiness to recognize Israel should be viewed as a positive development. Still, Jerusalem summarily rejected the proposal. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war and the right of return to the millions of Palestinian refugees were conditions that Israeli leaders couldn't swallow.

The Arab response to the Fahd plan was not monolithic. Naturally,

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the Egyptians saw the proposal as an alternative to their own course and showed no enthusiasm for it. King Hussein of Jordan was the strongest supporter of the Saudi initiative. The PLO response was mixed seeing the potential for the plan to become a fully-fledged Arab peace initiative. The staunchest opposition came from Syria, which officially maintained that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict under existing conditions of Arab weakness would not lead to peace but would simply constitute an Arab surrender.

Given these opposite reactions, the Arabs failed to endorse the Fahd Plan in their summit, held in Fez, Morocco in November 1981. Several heads of states, including the leaders of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria abstained. Others had reservations on some provisions and few supported the plan. Accordingly, after a four-hour closed session, the attending Arab leaders decided to suspend the meeting and reconvene it at a later date, thus shelving the plan while keeping the project alive. Less than a year later (September 1982) at the reconvened Arab summit the Saudi proposal was accepted as a set of principles that constituted the Arab framework for peace with Israel. Despite this Arab endorsement, the plan went no-where. Instead of focusing on searching for a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict the whole region was preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and then the Gulf War (1990-91). Two decades after the then Crown Prince Fahd introduced his vision for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, his brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, presented a similar plan to pursue the same goal. The Abdullah Plan fared no better than the Fahd Plan.

Abdullah Plan:

In the early 2000s two interrelated developments provided the Saudis with strong incentives to resume an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and present another peace proposal. First, violence between the Palestinians and Israelis had substantially escalated following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada (uprising), which started in September 2000 when the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon visited a Muslim holy site in Jerusalem. The growing number of victims created a sense of despair and a spirit of hopelessness on both sides. Furthermore, the images of Israeli bulldozers demolishing Palestinian homes in a frenzy of fear and

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panic and American-built jet fighters or helicopters firing on Palestinians have inflamed Arab and Saudi public opinion and intensified the rage against the United States. Second, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States dealt a heavy blow to the American-Saudi relations. Osama bin Laden was a Saudi citizen and 15 out of the 19 hijackers held Saudi passports. Thus, the Saudi image was badly tarnished and many influential members inside and outside the American administration called for an assessment and an examination of the close relations between Washington and Riyadh. Feeling the pressure, the Saudi leaders thought a conciliatory gesture toward Israel could take off some of the heat and improve their country's image.

Within this context, Crown Prince Abdullah formulated his proposal for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. After a long consultation with Egypt and Jordan it was decided that Riyadh should take the initiative. In an interview published in New York Times in February 2002 the Crown Prince talked about the need for a bold step to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Few weeks later the Saudi plan was debated and endorsed by the other Arab leaders in their fourteenth summit, held in Beirut, Lebanon in March 2002. The Abdullah Plan is similar to the Fahd Plan in calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since 1967 war, including full withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights and the remaining occupied parts of southern Lebanon, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital, confirming the Palestinian refugees' right to return to their land in Israel. In return, the Abdullah Plan goes one step further than the Fahd Plan. Instead of a mere recognition of the Jewish state to exist in the Middle East, Crown Prince Abdullah offered Israel full peace, including political, economic and cultural normalization. Based on this initiative the Arabs accepted to give Israel a complete integration in the region. As the Israeli paper Haaretz put it "Falafel in Damascus and stalls in the international market of Dubai; an Israeli flag in Riyadh; programming engineers in Bahrain and gas from Qatar to Israel." [14],

[14] Zvi Bar'el, "Prince of Peace", *Haaretz*, February 28, 2002, on line at www.haaretzdaily.com.

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The Abdullah Plan received a mixed response from the Arab world. The initial reaction was positive. The Palestinians supported the proposal. For most Arab states – especially Qatar, Oman, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, which had had some level of relations with Israel – there was no reason to oppose the plan. Israel posed a problem to them only inasmuch as it roused passions among their people, and any solution that had a Saudi stamp of approval – and particularly that of Crown Prince Abdullah, who has a reputation as an Arab nationalist – was considered a significant development. Jordan and Egypt had a clear interest in the initiative, since it served to validate the agreements they had reached earlier with Israel, and for which they had been excoriated by many Arabs. Syria and Iraq did not reject the plan and Lebanon voiced its concern that the more than 300,000 Palestinians living in refugee camps there will move to Israel once an agreement is signed. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi rejected the plan saying it was "shocking and entailed cheap bargaining.[15]"

The United States was slow in embracing the plan. The Bush administration's caution appeared to derive in part from its determination not to end up where President Bill Clinton did, with high hopes for peace turning abruptly into a spasm of violence. Moreover, there was a widespread presumption that the administration wanted to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a back burner while it weighed its options on ousting the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. After some hesitation, Washington decided that the Saudi plan had the potential to end the violence and, accordingly, praised Crown Prince Abdullah and urged other leaders to build on his initiative to address the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Finally, the Israelis tried not to be outmaneuvered by the Saudis. The Israeli President Moshe Katzav, whose role is largely ceremonial, offered to travel to Riyadh, or alternatively, to receive Crown Prince Abdullah in Jerusalem in order to hear the details of his proposal firsthand. Similarly, Prime Minister Sharon was skeptical about the Saudi proposal. Sharon announced that he was not going to disregard the

[15] Gil Hoffman, "Sharon Warns Saudi Plan May Be Arab Plot", *Jerusalem Post*, March 3, 2002, on line at www.jpost.com.

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Saudi plan completely even he did not attach a lot of credence to it. The prime minister stated that Israeli government would not leave any stone unturned if there was a chance for peace. Furthermore, Sharon expressed his desire to go to the Arab summit in Beirut to explain the Israeli position. Finally, Israeli officials noted that no formal proposal had been made, complaining that the Saudis had gone to the press instead of contacting Israel directly. They also suggested that the true goal was to throw Prime Minister Sharon on the defense diplomatically, by putting him in the position of rejecting a vague but seemingly innovative offer.[16]

With regard to the substance of the Saudi plan, the Israeli government considered Arab's call for the return of refugees, the division of Jerusalem, and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders as a nonstarter. According to an official statement issued by the Israeli government, "a decision calling for a complete withdrawal to the 1967 lines makes negotiations superfluous. Withdrawal to the 1967 borders is an absolute blow to Israel's security.[17]" Given these fundamental differences between the Israeli and Arab visions for peace in the Middle East, the Abdullah Plan, like the Fahd Plan two decades earlier, was gradually shelved.

Saudi Arabia and Israel: Concluding Remarks

Several conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion of Saudi Arabia's stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, rhetoric aside, since the early 1970s Saudi leaders have advocated a peaceful settlement with Israel. This peaceful settlement is conditioned on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and confirming the Palestinian refugees' right for return or compensation. In return, the Saudis are willing to recognize and normalize relations with Israel. Second, the Saudi contribution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has been mainly financial and diplomatic, not military. For the last several decades Saudi Arabia has used its oil revenues to provide substantial financial aid to Palestinian organizations, particularly the PLO, and front-line states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). It is true that Ri-

[16] Serge Schmemann, "A Saudi Peace Idea, Suddenly in the Spotlight", *New York Times*, March 3, 2002, on line at www.nytimes.com.

[17] Aluf Benn, "Official Government Response: Saudi Plan Endangers Israel's Security", *Haaretz*, March 3, 2002, on line at www.haaretzdaily.com.

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yadh funded arms deals, which enabled the Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians to fight Israel. But also it is true that the kingdom has used its financial leverage to reward moderation and punish extremism (as defined by Saudi officials). For example, Saudi money facilitated the shift in Egyptian policy in the early 1970s from pro-Soviet to pro-American approach. Similarly, Saudi money did not go to extremist Marxist Palestinian organizations. Instead the PLO, which generally adopted less extremist stand on the conflict with Israel, received most of the Saudi funds. On the diplomatic front, the Saudis have always sought to pressure the United States to open dialogue with the PLO and to take a balanced and even-handed approach.

Third, until the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, when Islamic fundamentalism became the main issue of contention between Washington and Riyadh, American support to Israel constituted the main obstacle in the U.S.-Saudi relations. Since the 1945 meeting between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud the Palestinian question has been discussed between the two sides. The Saudis have sought to use their close relations with Washington to influence its policy in the Middle East. For most part the Saudis did not succeed and were frustrated with what they perceive as American bias for Israel and against the Arabs. Occasionally, the Saudis, and other Arabs sought to rely on European countries instead of the United States to promote their rights. This strategy, however, is restrained by the presumption that even though the Europeans have a more balanced view on the Arab-Israeli conflict than the Americans, their capabilities are limited. Fourth, Israeli officials have generally viewed Saudi Arabia as an Islamic fanatic state that uses its massive resources to promote and fund hate against the Jewish state. Israeli supporters in the United States have sought to undermine the close cooperation the kingdom has had with the United States for a long time. Despite this animosity, Saudi Arabia is not Israel's number one enemy. On the Israeli list, countries such as Islamic Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Syria are ahead of Saudi Arabia.

Fifth, the Saudis' opposition to Israel was not enough to ensure their wholehearted support for the Palestinians. Indeed, while the kingdom has always been a strong advocate of the Palestinian cause (i.e., the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and the necessity to establish

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a sovereign Palestinian state), the relationship with the Palestinian leadership has not been always smooth. Before the 1967 war, the Saudis had not been deeply involved with the Palestinian movement. In part this was because the Palestinian activists of the day were typically either leftists or followers of Egypt's Nasser. Following the war, the kingdom emerged as a central player in the Middle East conflict and became increasingly involved with the Palestinians. Riyadh has always been concerned about Palestinian radicalism, particularly the strong leftist tone in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, the Saudis established strong ties with the mainstream group within the Palestinian movement led by Yasser Arafat. Despite the generous financial support the Saudis provided Arafat, they were suspicious of his intentions and policies. This Saudi suspicion proved true in the Gulf war, when the Palestinian leader supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. For the next several years the kingdom froze any relationship with the PLO. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has continued to lobby the international community and the United States on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Since the late 1990s relations between Riyadh and the PLO/Palestinian Authority have been resumed.

Finally, despite the two Saudi peace plans and the kingdom's endorsement of peaceful negotiations between different Arab parties and Israel. Riyadh is likely to be among the latest Arab states to make peace with the Jewish state. The Israeli flag is likely to fly in many Arab capitals before it flies in Riyadh. The Saudi traditions of consensus-building and their perception of their country as the guardian of Islam and Arabism are likely to make Riyadh very slow and cautious in any rapprochement with Jerusalem. Other Gulf monarchies are under less restraints in formulating their policy toward Israel.

The Other Gulf Monarchies and Israel

The other Gulf monarchies that share the Persian Gulf with Saudi Arabia are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the 1950s and 1960s these five small states played a limited role, if any, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They were not fully-independent and later became involved in what can be described as a process of nation-building. Given their small size and population they were mainly occupied with domestic issues, their foreign policy interests

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focused on the Persian Gulf. This limited involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was drastically altered by three regional developments, which shaped the Gulf monarchies' attitude to Israel and the Palestinians.

The first turning point was the sharp rise in oil prices following the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Suddenly most of these oil-producing countries enjoyed massive oil revenues and unprecedented wealth. These financial resources gave them substantial political leverage. Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE have given generous financial aid to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. Moreover, the remittances laborers working in these Gulf monarchies sent home represented a significant proportion of the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese economies. Accordingly, these front-line states felt obligated to consult with the rich Gulf states on important issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The second regional development was Yassir Arafat's decision to support Saddam Hussein when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. This meant that Kuwait and the other Gulf monarchies were on the same side with Israel against Iraq, which received Palestinian sympathy and support. The majority of the population in the Gulf monarchies felt betrayed by the Palestinians. Arafat, who was a frequent visitor to the Gulf states, has never been forgiven for his decision to support the Iraqis and has not been allowed to visit most of these countries. Their financial support to the Palestinians was substantially reduced. On the other hand, this bitterness toward the Palestinians meant more acceptance and tolerance to Israel. Following the Gulf war (1990-91) the Gulf monarchies have become less critical of Israel.

The third interrelated development, which shaped the Gulf monarchies' approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, was the signing of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time ever the two sides recognized each other. This step opened the door for reconciliation between the Gulf monarchies and Israel. The Gulf states felt that they did not need to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves. Thus, low-level diplomatic and commercial contacts have been established between some of the Gulf states and Israel.

In formulating their policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and their approach to Israel the five Gulf monarchies have had to reconcile pressure from different directions. First, for several decades large Palestin-

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ian communities have resided in the Gulf region. Given the small indigenous population and the large expatriate Palestinian communities, the Palestinians represent a big proportion of the overall Gulf populations. Furthermore, many Palestinians occupy key positions in the commercial, economic, and educational sectors as well as in the mass media. They lobby the Gulf governments to adopt a strong anti-Israel and pro-Palestine position. Second, the escalating violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians adds more pressure on the Gulf governments to adopt a hard-line attitude toward the Jewish state. The impact of this violence has been further intensified in the last several years due to the revolution in information technology. Satellite dishes and internet have tremendously increased the Gulf populations' exposure to regional and international affairs. Third, the uncompromising attitude adopted by the regional superpowers (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) toward Israel further complicates any rapprochement between the latter and the small Gulf states. In formulating their stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict the five Gulf monarchies have to take into consideration the Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi reactions. These three countries are too big and too powerful to be ignored by the smaller Gulf states.

Fourth, geography and history play an important role in shaping the five Gulf monarchies' regional and international policy. These coastal states have developed traditions of relative tolerance established through centuries of contact with seafaring traders in the Persian Gulf. For example, the practice of Wahhabism is much less rigid in Qatar than in Saudi Arabia. In Oman, Hindu temples, Christian churches, and Muslim mosques can be seen side by side. These traditions of relative tolerance and acceptance of foreign culture have facilitated Western and Israeli ties and contacts with the people and governments of the five Gulf monarchies. Additionally, none of these Gulf states share common borders with Israel. Put differently, Israel does not represent direct threat to their national security. Fifth, considering the huge technological gap between Israel and the five Gulf monarchies, cooperation with the Jewish state will have many benefits. Many officials in the Gulf states value Israel's technological advances and skills particularly in the areas of solar energy, drip irrigation and other agricultural techniques. The severe scarcity of water in the Gulf region makes Israel's know-how in

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water conservation of particular interest. Finally, the often-exaggerated Jewish influence on American society and policy adds more attraction to establish good relations with Israel. In other words, for some officials in the Gulf states the road to Washington goes through Jerusalem. By recognizing the Jewish state and establishing commercial and diplomatic ties with it, some Gulf states hope to improve their image in the United States.

Taken all these factors into consideration, the five Gulf monarchies, with some variation, have always expressed strong solidarity with the Palestinians and condemnation to Israel. Along with Saudi Arabia, they have provided massive financial aid to the front-line states and to the Palestinians. Repeatedly they have voiced their support to the peace process and commitment to a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the United Nations resolutions, which would guarantee an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories in both Syria and Lebanon and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In return, the five Gulf monarchies are prepared to recognize Israel and normalize relations with it. Indeed, the main difference between the five Gulf states' stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and that of Saudi Arabia is the willingness of Oman and Qatar to move from denouncing Israel to playing a role of mediator between Jerusalem and its Arab neighbors. Following the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 both Oman and Qatar have developed low-level diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel.

Oman has taken the lead in supporting the Arab-Israeli peace process. As early as 1979, Muscat was among a handful of Arab states, which supported President Sadat's peace treaty with Israel and resisted pressure to isolate Egypt. Since the early 1990s, Oman has been an active participant in all aspects of the multilateral peace-process working groups created by the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. The Sultanate was the first Gulf state to host an Israeli delegation to a conference on water resources, which created the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Muscat.[18] In December 1995, Oman welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on his first visit to a Gulf state, where he met Sultan Qaboos Bin Said al-Said. Rabin's visit inaugurated a new period in the relations between the two countries. The two leaders agreed to

[18] For more information see the center's website at www.medrc.org.om.

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open interest sections, as a precursor to full diplomatic relations.[19]

These Omani initiatives to establish economic ties and political dialogue with Israel can be explained by three interrelated factors. First, they can be seen as an extension of Muscat's long tradition of pro-Western policy. The peace process has also been supported by other Arab countries with strong ties with the West, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Second, Muscat's willingness to accept and deal with Israel reflects a deep sense of both pragmatism and independence. Over the years, the Sultanate has cooperated closely with Israel in methods of desalination, drip irrigation, and other agricultural techniques. Third, an opening to Israel can be seen in part as a reaction to the Palestinian support for and involvement in the Dhufar rebellion, which threatened political stability in the Sultanate for most of the 1960s and early 1970s.[20]

Like Oman, Qatar hosted an Israeli delegation in the multilateral talks on arms control that was created by the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Doha's rapprochement with Jerusalem is driven by both economic interests and political considerations. With proven reserves of 509 trillion cubic feet (tcf), Qatar contains the third largest natural gas reserves in the world behind Russia and Iran.[21] Economic prosperity depends on the state's ability to export increasing volumes of this hydrocarbon resource to the rest of the world. Since the early 1990s Doha has invested heavily in creating and expanding huge and sophisticated infrastructure to extract, market, and sell its natural gas. Israel represents not only an attractive market to the Qatari gas, but also a potential transit route to shipments to the lucrative European markets.

In addition to these economic imperatives, political considerations have played a significant role in formulating the Qatari approach toward Israel. Since 1995 the emirate has been ruled by Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, who overthrew his father in a palace coup. The emir has shown strong interest in allying his tiny state with Western powers particularly the United States. This pro-Western stand has proven irre-

[19] Jacob Abadi, "Israel's Relations with Oman and the Persian Gulf States", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.20, No.1, Fall 1996, pp.46-73, p.50.

[20] Gawdat Bahgat, "Security in the Gulf: The View from Oman", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.30, No.4, December 1999, pp.445-458, p.450.

[21] Energy Information Administration, *Country Profile: Qatar*, October 2002, www.eia.doe.gov

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sistible to Washington. The 2003 war in Iraq was largely conducted from Qatar, not Saudi Arabia. Indeed, shortly after the war Qatar became the main hub to American troops in the Persian Gulf. This alliance with the United States reflects the emir's desire to "put Qatar on the map" and to show independence from Saudi patronage and influence. Finally, Sheikh Hamad has introduced and pursued aggressive political reform. This includes municipal and parliamentary elections, where women have the right to vote and run for office. Most notably, the Qatari government not only encourages a free press, it also sponsors the satellite television station Al-Jazeera, the most popular in the Middle East.

This liberal pro-Western environment has encouraged the Qatari authority to adopt a reconciliatory stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and to establish and maintain commercial and diplomatic ties with Israel. Thus, in September 2000 Sheikh Hamad met the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in New York, where the two leaders attended the United Nations Millennium Summit. After the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in September 2000, Egypt pulled its ambassador from Israel, Jordan left its vacant ambassadorship position in Tel Aviv unfilled, and Oman, as well as Morocco and Tunisia, cut trade ties. Israel's interest section in Qatar remained open, albeit at a very low level and out of the public eye. In May 2003 Israeli foreign minister met in Paris with his Qatari counterpart to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. After the meeting the Qatari foreign minister said, "We don't object to having a treaty with Israel but we don't think it's necessary now.[22]"

Despite these commercial and diplomatic ties between Israel and both Oman and Qatar the Gulf states are not likely to pursue full diplomatic relations with the Jewish state without some kind of solution with Syria and a recognition of basic Palestinian rights. Both Muscat and Doha are likely to continue their low-level rapprochement with Jerusalem and play the role of mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[22] Herb Keinon, "Israel Holds Talks with Qatar", *Jerusalem Post*, May 14, 2002, www.jpost.com

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The UK's Aircraft Carriers and their Rationale

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Under the Strategic Defence Review, the U.K. made the decision to acquire two larger, 50,000 tonnes, aircraft carriers. This article examines the United Kingdom's plans to replace its ageing fleet of aircraft carriers. The use of aircraft carriers during the international crises that have arisen since the end of the Cold War is surveyed, and the inherent flexibility that aircraft carriers provide both militarily and politically is noted. The UK's aircraft carrier program is compared with that of other nations which possess one or more aircraft carriers. The question of aircraft carrier vulnerability is also discussed.

Key Words: Aircraft Carriers, UK Aircraft Carrier Program, Joint Strike Fighter, Naval Swarms, International Aircraft Carriers, Naval Power Projection

The aircraft carrier has been at the forefront in both armed conflict and peace. It has developed many roles during war including reconnaissance, power projection ashore, aerial combat, antisubmarine warfare and in peacetime provides a visual presence of power in order to demonstrate political resolve. The first section of this article demonstrates that aircraft carriers can provide significant flexibility as was highlighted in the regional conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In this section the political rationale that determined the United Kingdom's requirement for the procurement of two aircraft carriers is enunciated. The primary document that led to the procurement decision was known as the "Strategic Defence Review". The impact of September 11, 2001, is addressed in a "New Chapter" added to the *Strategic Defence Review*. This reaffirmed the importance of flexible assets.

Aircraft Carriers and International Crises Since the End of the Cold War

Aircraft carriers have proven themselves in a wide variety of crises in the world. These operations may be classified as "operations other than war". In the current international security environment many of the wars that occur are intra-state. Even in this form of conflict, aircraft carriers have demonstrated an ability to respond to both high to low

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intensity warfare. In the current international security environment, uncertainty as to where the next crisis will occur means that planners find it difficult to provide troops and protect them. The aircraft carrier is a joint operating platform that is capable of dealing with a wide spectrum of scenarios at different levels of conflict intensity.

The United Kingdom takes and will probably continue to take an active role in international peacekeeping. This involves open-ended commitments that are a regular feature of the current international system. Aircraft carriers provide a sustainable support element as long as there are at least two available for deployment. They are able to maintain strong national presence in a region for an unspecified time. Aircraft carriers also have specific attributes that make them suitable for peacekeeping operations: they do not require neighbouring-state support nor diplomatic overflight, as do land-based aircraft; they can provide medical and emergency aid; and they can be in sight or over the horizon, whichever form of presence is required.

The requirement for highly flexible, effective and powerful military forces embodied by aircraft carriers has been demonstrated by their use in several operations: Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Iraq 1990-91), Eastern Exit (Somalia 1991-94), Provide Comfort (Iraqi Kurds 1991), Provide Promise (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996), Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995) and Southern Watch (Iraq 1992-present). These responses would not have been possible without the use of aircraft carriers.

In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the initial aim of the deployment of military forces was to contain the conflict, prevent a possible advance into Saudi Arabia and keep the ports and air bases required for reinforcements. Naval forces, combined with light ground forces and quick-reaction air forces, contributed to this initial deployment. Within an hour after the Iraqi invasion commenced, one carrier group was ordered to the Gulf of Oman and another to the eastern Mediterranean. Carrier air power arrived immediately, ready for combat and with its own logistical support, and was available to supplement the increasing number of aircraft based on airfields ashore. Indeed, it has been suggested that in the absence of the availability of the aircraft carriers and the naval forces in the region, Saudi Arabia would

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have been taking a monumental risk in allowing in the coalition forces. There was concern about coalition shipping in the Mediterranean and its vulnerability if Libya had made its support of Iraq more tangible. Subsequently, in September 1990 the NATO Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean was activated and in January 1991 the carrier HMS Ark Royal and her escorts were deployed. This freed an additional U.S. carrier to move to the Gulf.

In the Desert Storm campaign to liberate Kuwait, approximately 20% of the sorties launched by U.S. air power came from aircraft carriers in the Gulf and the Red Sea. The six aircraft carriers were used to launch a wide range of attacks against strategic and tactical targets, and provided support and command operations for Navy and Marine aircraft. The six aircraft carriers emerged unscathed despite fears of anti-ship missile attack, and it appears that the initial fears about sending them to the Gulf were unfounded.

In the former Yugoslavia, the western intervention during the initial stages of the conflict was limited to enforcement of the no-fly zone and the economic sanctions. Despite the fact that the theatre of operations was close to NATO air bases, aircraft carriers still had a role. During the conflict's initial phase, aircraft carriers were able to be situated quickly without the necessity of arranging political approval for land basing. Indeed, throughout the conflict aircraft carriers provided a platform free from the political objections that affected the aircraft operation from air bases in Italy, Hungary and Greece. The ability of aircraft carriers to move and find more suitable weather for flight operations was particularly useful when aircraft based in Italy were grounded. Carrier-based aircraft also participated in aerial missions such as monitoring and enforcing the no-fly zone and providing close air support for United Nations' forces. In addition, they provided a base for search and rescue of downed pilots, as was evident when the U.S. Marine Corps successfully extracted an F-16 pilot.

During Operation Deliberate Force (the air strikes in the former Yugoslavia), Britain maintained one carrier on station at a readiness of one hour's notice for three years. Indeed, figures from the Ministry of Defence stated that six Sea Harriers from HMS Illustrious had flown over 200 sorties. The Sea Harriers operated not only as fighters, but also

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in the roles of photo-reconnaissance, close support and ground-attack aircraft. The submarine threat was deemed low, and because of this the anti-submarine helicopters were moved to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and were replaced by transport helicopters.

In March 1997 the Royal Navy helped enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq when it was not certain that neighbouring nations would permit their bases to be used. It was therefore essential that the Royal Navy had an aircraft carrier for this purpose. In fact, the U.K. took the leading role in the air strikes of Operation Deliberate Force in the former Yugoslavia. This situation is becoming increasingly familiar, where much uncertainty exists whether neighbouring states will allow the use of airfields and ports. The U.K. therefore needs the ability to operate wherever in the world British interests dictate without having to rely on host-nation support. Indeed, since November 1997 the apparent Saudi Arabian veto on the use of its air bases for offensive strikes against Iraq has forced the United States and the United Kingdom to rely on carrier-based aircraft. In November 1997 the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was redeployed from the Caribbean to the Mediterranean to give the option of deploying a carrier to the Gulf. Then in January 1998 increased tension led to the deployment of HMS Invincible to the Gulf.

Carriers were used in the air campaign against Afghanistan. By November 12, 2001, carrier-borne aircraft had conducted an average of 60 sorties per day and had dropped over 350 tonnes of ordnance on targets there. This amount of delivered ordnance was made possible by improvements in equipment, air-to-air and surface-to-air coordination and mission planning. Over the past decade, this has permitted a four-fold increase in the firepower an aircraft carrier can provide.

A U.S. Navy paper in the summer of 1996 pointed out that aircraft carriers had been used in ten separate crises since 1993 and that the U.S. Air Force's B-2 and B-1 bombers had not been used. Whilst the paper was designed to fight an interservice battle, the point is that aircraft carriers are more usable and more versatile. The strength of aircraft carriers lies in their ability to project power in a crisis.

The Strategic Defence Review and Beyond

The Strategic Defence Review launched in 1997 assessed that within

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ten years Britain's current trio of aircraft carriers would be close to decommissioning, which meant that a decision had to be made whether to replace them. The outcome was that two larger 50,000-tonne carriers would replace the three weighing 20,000 tonnes. The two larger carriers would allow a mix of helicopters and warplanes. The suggestion was made that the two could be more cost effective.

This decision to acquire larger carriers was at the forefront of the UK's shift from a continental European strategy to one of expeditionary forces used for power projection in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations. The following quote highlights the decision that was made:

> In the post-Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us. So we plan to buy two new larger aircraft carriers to project power more flexibly around the world. New transport aircraft and ships will move our people and equipment rapidly to troublespots.

Later in the Strategic Defence Review the rationale is enunciated further:

> Aircraft carriers will have a wide utility, including for deterrence and coercion. Our current INVINCIBLE class carriers will be given a wider power projection role by the development of a "Joint Force 2000" combining RN and RAF Harrier aircraft. To meet our longer term needs, we plan to replace our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile, carriers capable of carrying a more powerful force, including a future carrier borne aircraft to replace the Harrier.

The carrier decision included the need to be able to make a contribution to multinational operations and to cooperate closely with the United States' forces throughout a number of potential operations. In the supporting essays to the Strategic Defence Review, the issue of host-nation and neighbouring-nation support for power projection in relation to the carrier program, along with the flexibility carriers provide, is addressed:

> One of the key longer-term issues in the Review has been whether to replace the current generation of aircraft carriers and their aircraft, and

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> if so with what. Our conclusion is that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that we will always have access to suitable air bases. Even when we do, experience has shown that bases may not always be available in the early stages of a crisis, and that their infrastructure is not always able to support the full range of operations required. In these and a range of other operational circumstances, aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility. They can also offer a coercive presence which may forestall the need for warfighting, as recently in the Gulf. We judge that there is therefore a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers.

The Strategic Defence Review is predicated on input from a Royal Navy study called "Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations". This study focused on a new operational environment that is more uncertain and unstable than that of the Cold War. The new environment envisions crises and threats to peace and security to occur anywhere at any time. The defence review noted that the United Kingdom has responsibilities as a leading member of the international community. Britain's interests are extensive. The nation's economy is based on international trade, with 90 per cent of exports being by sea. Also, Britain has 13 overseas territories. These international interests lean Britain towards a maritime forces strategy. Open-ocean engagements that were a characteristic of the Cold War are no longer the sole domain; new missions are identified in the littoral regions. The scale and threat of the open ocean has receded with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The focus has now become the littorals.

The littoral region extends from close to the shore to 500 or even 1,000 miles off the coastline. Once close to the shore, the distance for maritime support can extend up to 1,000 miles. The SDR recognised that forces were required that would be able to conduct operations in littoral areas to benefit from maritime platforms in the power- projection role.

The Secretary of Defence, Geoff Hoon, in a speech about the latest addition to "The New Chapter," outlined the importance of the carrier program:

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> The new Joint Strike Fighter will play a key role in our future operations, being amongst the most flexible of our assets. And the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers will ensure that the UK can project force where it is needed, with massively enhanced capabilities over our present ships.

The new aircraft carriers will not only provide power projection capability. There is also the ability to conduct electronic intelligence operations from aircraft platforms or indeed from unmanned aerial vehicles. Electronic intelligence was important in verifying the intentions of Serbian commanders during the Bosnian campaign. These intelligence assets flew from aircraft carriers.

The Political Influence of Aircraft Carriers

The concept of defence-diplomacy through the use of aircraft carriers merits closer attention. The visible presence, especially of a 50,000 tonne aircraft carrier, or the possibility that the carrier could appear over the horizon offers some political influence. Carriers provide political flexibility through proportionality. The pre-positioning of an aircraft carrier is a national decision that if taken in time could be sufficient to prevent an impending crisis. Hence, aircraft carriers provide preventative, precautionary and pre-emptive uses of force. These are only effective, however, if escalation is credible. A carrier has the ability to increase and sustain the speed of air operations quickly, and act as a deterrent.

The political influence that navies have been tasked with by their governments to influence the thinking of other governments has occurred for centuries. This influence is much in evidence today, since 70 per cent of world's population lives within 200 miles of the sea. Aircraft carriers as instruments of power offer two aspects in particular. Firstly, they serve a purpose of demonstrating a country's intentions and commitments. They offer a certain amount of ambiguity, which makes them a good initial response asset. This was demonstrated by the United States when they deployed their carrier to the Taiwan Straits when a potential crisis was in the offing. It allowed the U.S. to remain ambiguous about whether the U.S. would provide more military support for Taiwan. The other aspect is their endurance. They are able to deploy to

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a region for a number of months and provide a tangible show of force during their presence.

Flexibility is another of their important aspects. The uncertainties of time, place, enemy and ally mean that a carrier with its air power can be brought to bear in a timely manner. Additionally, the positioning of a floating airfield near a crisis area reduces the need for air-to-air refuelling and permits combat aircraft to concentrate on combat rather than transits between the air base and the theatre of operations.

An aircraft carrier as a warship has three fundamental aspects. The first is that a carrier is a mobile aerodrome and therefore can bring air power close to the geographical confines of conflict areas without needing host-nation support. The second is that by modern standards aircraft carriers are relatively large, with powerful engines. The third, related to the second, is that a carrier is extremely spacious in comparison with other warships and subsequently can contribute to command and control and provide logistical support to expeditionary forces.

The U.K. Carrier Program

The initial acquisition and program-cost of the carrier program is projected to be around £2.7 billion at current prices, with a through-life estimated cost of £6 billion. It is the flagship of the Ministry of Defence's smart procurement program. As we have seen, the decision has been made to purchase two large aircraft carriers to replace three smaller carriers. The Royal Navy's current fleet of three Invincible-class aircraft carriers means that two remain operational at any time, with the third in refit or reserve. See the table below for an outline of the Royal Navy's current Aircraft Carriers.

The Joint Strike Fighter

The aircraft carrier program is fundamentally linked to the new Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA). After an examination of various potential aircraft, the U.K. government confirmed in 2001 that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) met its FJCA requirement. The U.K. is the only Level 1 full collaborative partner. The Royal Navy is procuring 60 JSF aircraft out of total, with the United States, of 3,000, and is contributing £1.3 billion to the development and demonstration of the JSF. It is adding a further £600 million to address U.K.-specific requirements. One of

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the aims of the U.K.-specific requirements is to try to limit the number of British-only guided weapons to be integrated on the JSF. This may have ramifications for a number of guided weapons programs currently in the procurement phase, such as the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile and the Precision Guided Bomb program.

ROYAL NAVY'S CURRENT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Name	*Displace-ment Tons*	*Speed Knots*	*Aircraft Number*	*Deck Length*	*Order Date*	*Laid Down*	*Launch Date*	*In Service*
Bulwark	27,000	30	16	737				1960
Hermes	28,700	28	20(23)	550				1973
Invincible	20,600	28	14(21)	550	1973	1977	1980	Today
Illustrious	20,600	28	21	550	1976	1978	1982	Today
Ark Royal	20,600	28	21	550	1978	1981	1985	Today
Ocean	20,500	18	18	558	1993	1994	1995	1998

Notes

HMS Bulwark, like Hermes, was refitted between 1977 and 1979 to become a LPH/CVS to provide a back-up to Hermes and covered Hermes' major refit between 1979 and 1981. She was scrapped in 1984.
HMS Hermes was converted into a commando carrier between 1971 and 1973 and after pressure from NATO into a combined LPH/CVS in 1976/7. Bulwark, the RN's first LPH, was sold to India in 1986.
HMS Ark Royal was in reserve in 1997 and after a four year period of extended readiness, was towed to Rosyth in May 1999 for a major refit and rejoined the fleet in November 2001.
HMS Ocean was commissioned on 30 September 1998 and completed her trials program and initial BOST (Basic Operational Sea Training) in the spring of 1999.
HMS Illustrious, by modernisation, has increased the number of aircraft from 14 to 19 STOVL and 9 helicopters.

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998).

The Selection of the STOVL Variant of the Joint Strike Fighter

The Defence Procurement Minister, Lord Bach, announced on September 30, 2002, the selection of the short-take-off and vertical-landing (STOVL) variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to equip the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers. The carriers are designed to allow future adaptation to accommodate other aircraft designs, if required. The new carriers are planned to have a service life of

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up to fifty years, longer than that expected for the aircraft. Therefore, the design of the carrier can be adapted to handle more conventional aircraft if that becomes necessary later in the life of the carrier. The carrier will therefore have the capability of being fitted with catapults and arrestor gear, although the ship will be built with the ski ramp similar to the Royal Navy's current Invincible class carriers for STOVL operations.

The U.K. planning for the FJCA has been for a purchase of 150 of the JSF STOVL variant, replacing the Sea Harrier FA2s and Harrier GR7/9s operated by Joint Force Harrier. The cost of these 150 is estimated around £7 to £10 billion. The cost of each STOVL version of the JSF aircraft is around $50 million. However, with the early withdrawal of the FA2 in 2006, a downward revision in the number purchased is expected.

The RAF was inclined towards the STOVL version of the JSF because of its flexibility of deployment. It has the ability to disembark onto rough strips ashore and it also has a lower training penalty to keep the predominantly RAF-manned FJCA squadrons current. Also, it is suggested that the RAF was anxious that the FJCA not threaten Eurofighter Tranche 3, nor reduce its aspirations for the Future Offensive Air System. FOAS is intended to provide the offensive strike capability currently met by the Tornado GR4, which is due to be withdrawn from service in 2018. The Tranche 3 of the Eurofighter, which is due to be in service post-2010 (Tranche 3 of the Eurofigher is not slated for contractual agreement among the partner nations before 2006), is a candidate to meet elements of the FOAS capability. However, the JSF is emerging as the prime candidate to fulfil the majority of the crewed element of the FOAS capability.

Industry had voiced its support for the STOVL variant of the JSF. Rolls-Royce, the developer and supplier of the STOVL variant's shaft-driven lift fan, stands to gain from the decision in favour of the STOVL. The Royal Navy's position prior to the STOVL version was not quite so straight forward. Its own fixed-wing was a thing of the past, and in the context of the Joint Force Harrier the carriers are regarded as floating airfields. The Navy, however, was generally inclined towards the STOVL version, given its proclivity and experience over the past fifteen years of

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operating a STOVL aircraft in the form of the Sea Harrier. The Navy had accepted that the Carrier Variant (CV) aircraft could carry greater payloads over longer distances, but was a proponent of the STOVL version because it had better sortie generation rates, reduced aircraft impact on the overall platform size and cost, and the ability to operate in higher sea states.

COUNTRIES WITH ONE OR MORE WARSHIP IN SERVICE CAPABLE OF EMBARKING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT

Country	Aircraft Carrier
United States of America	7 Nimitz (CVN) 1 Enterprise (CVN) 2 Kittyhawk (CV) 1 Kennedy (CV) 1 Forrestal (CV) 5 Wasp (LHD)* 5 Tarawa (LHA)* 3 Iwo Jima (LPH/MCS)
United Kingdom	2 Invincible (CVA)* 1 Ocean (LPH)
France	Charles de Gaulle
Russia	Kuznetsov
Brazil	Minas Gerais
India	Viraat*
Italy	Giuseppe Garibaldi*
Spain	Principe de Asturias*
Thailand	Chakri Naruebet*

*Ships are only capable of operating STOVL aircraft. LPH is Amphibuous Transport Helicopter Carrier
Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998)

The size of the carrier has been increased quite significantly to accommodate and operate an air wing sufficient to achieve the desired sortie-generation rates. This meant that whichever variant, whether CV or STOVL, of the JSF had been selected the carrier would still havedisplaced around 55,000 tons. The sea-state impacts less on aircraft operating limits with a carrier this size, and the carrier should be able to operate in conditions up to Sea State 6.

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International Aircraft Carriers

This section outlines the other countries in the world that possess an aircraft carrier capability. The table below outlines these countries.

UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CONSTRUCTION

CV/CVN Number	Laid Down	Launched	Commissioned	Paid Off
59 Forrestal	14 July 52	11 Dec 54	1 Oct 55	1993
60 Saratoga	16 Dec 52	8 Oct 55	14 Apr 56	1994
61 Ranger	2 Aug 54	24 Sep 56	10 Aug 57	1993
62 Independence	1 July 55	6 June	10 Jan 59	
63 Kitty Hawk	27 Dec 56	21 May 60	29 Apr 61	
64 Constellation	14 Sep 57	8 Oct 60	29 Apr 61	
65 Enterprise	4 Feb 58	24 Sep 60	25 Nov 61	
66 America	9 Jan 61	1 Feb 64	23 Jan 65	1996
67 John F Kennedy	22 Oct 64	27 May 67	7 Sep 68	
68 Nimitz	22 Jun 68	13 May 67	7 Sep 78	
69 Eisenhower	15 Aug 70	11 Oct 75	18 Oct 77	
70 Carl Vinson	11 Oct 75	15 Mar 80	13 Mar 82	
71 Theo Roosevelt	13 Oct 81	27 Oct 84	25 Oct 86	
72 Abrhm Lincoln	3 Nov 84	13 Feb 88	11 Nov 89	
73 G Washington	25 Aug 86	21 Jul 90	4 July 92	
74 John C Stennis	13 Mar 91	13 Nov 93	9 Dec 95	
75 Harry S Truman	29 Nov 93	14 Sep 96	July 98	
76 Ronald Reagan	Feb 98	Mar 00	Anticipated Spring 2003	

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998)

United States' Aircraft Carriers

The nuclear-power aircraft carrier (CVN) Nimitz Class was laid down between 1968 and 2002 and is composed of nine vessels. The table below outlines the program of authorisation, construction and decommissioning.

The commencement of the CVN 77, which is basically a similar de-

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sign to the Nimitz Class, began in 2002 and is scheduled for completion in 2008. Congress allocated £87 billion for its development during 1998-2001. The U.S. Navy's Future Aircraft Carrier (CVNX) program schedule is subject to a delay of six months or more.

THE CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	27 Knots			
Displacement	Standard: 36,600 tons Fully Loaded: 45,550 tons			
Range	Five years continuous steaming before reactor refuelling required			
Complement	Ship' Company 1,150	Aircrew 550	Flag 50	Total 1,750
Power Plant	2 Nuclear Power Plants Two propellers with 4 blades each, 80,000 ch (56,000 kW) Electric power: 21,400 kW			
Aircraft	35-40 mix of Rafale M, Super Etendard, and E-2C Hawkeye			
Helicopters	2 x AS 565 Panther or alternative load of amphibious helicopters instead of fixed wing aircraft			
Notes: 800 Marines could be carried temporarily				

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998) and Global Security:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cdg.htm
(internet accessed) November 8, 2002

France

France at present only has one aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle. It was ordered in 1987, laid down in 1989, launched in 1994, and commissioned on the 28 September 2000. It is powered by a French-type reactor, which is slow in comparison with U.S. nuclear-powered carriers. It is the main unit of the French Navy's surface fleet. It has significant air power, with a highly integrated combat system. The air wing is composed of 40 Rafale M combat aircraft, early-warning aircraft and has the ability to conduct 100 air missions a day. The carrier uses a catapult launch system for the Rafales, Hawkeye, and modernised Super Etandards and achieves a speed of 300km^{-1} in 75 metres. The flight deck can launch one aircraft every 30 seconds or coordinate a mass landing of 20 aircraft in 12 minutes. The Data links to NATO specifications L16 and L11 permit Hawkeye early warning aircraft to transmit tactical situation

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data to NATO naval units and combat aircraft. Further details are provided in the table below.

THE KUZNETSOV AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	30 Knots			
Displacement	Standard: 45,900 tons Fully Loaded: 58,500 tons			
Range	8,500 miles at 18 knots; 3, 850 miles at 29 knots			
Complement	Ship' Company	Aircrew	Flag	Total
Officers	200			
Other ranks				
Totals	1,960	626	40	3,626
Power Plant	2 x 50,000 hp gas. turbines; 8 boilers; 4 fixed pitch props., turbogenerators 9 x 1500 kW, diesel gen. 6 x 1500 kW			
Aircraft	18 x "Flanker'; 2 x 'Frogfoot'			
Helicopters	12 x Helix with heavy surface to surface missile armament			
Notes: It is officially a cruiser				

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998) and *Global Security*:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/1143_5.htm
(internet accessed) November 8, 2002

Russia

Russia currently has one carrier: the Kuznetsov, which came into service in 1991. The Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov was used in a training cruise early in 1996. In 1997 it was immobilised in the Northern Fleet shipyard awaiting repairs which were 20% complete. In July 1998 it underwent a two-year overhaul and was declared operational in the Northern Fleet on November 3, 1998. In the autumn of 2000 it was involved in the operation off the Kola Peninsula after the loss of the submarine Kursk. In 2001 the 12 Su-33 Flanker fighters were due to be supplemented by another 12 Su-33 Flankers in an attack role, that are equipped with air-to-ground ordnance. Russia plans to acquire two large carriers, but the present economic situation prevents them from implementing this.

Brazil

The number of aircraft carriers Brazil possesses remains uncertain since the Minas Gerais was not considered likely to be replaced. It was nonetheless decommissioned in 2001 following the purchase of the

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French carrier the Foch. The fate of the Minais Gerais was still unknown as of July 2002, with China having reportedly made a surprise bid for its purchase.

THE MINAS GERAIS AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	24 Knots		
Displacement	Standard: 15,890 tons Fully Loaded:18,190 tons		
Range	12,000 miles at 12 knots; 6,200 miles at 23 knots		
Complement Totals	Ship' Company 1,000	Aircrew 300	Total 3,626
Aircraft	6 x S-2E Tracker		
Helicopters	4-6 SH-3D Sea Kings; 2 x Ecureuil; 3 x Super Puma		
Notes: M capacity of 20 aircraft. Steam catapult installed on purchase			

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998)

THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER THE SÃO PAULO (PREVIOUSLY THE FOCH)

Speed	32 Knots		
Displacement	Standard: 27,307 tons Fully Loaded:32,780 tons		
Range	7,500 miles at 18 knots; 4,800 miles at 24 knots		
Complement Capability[a]	Ship' Company 1,017	Aircrew 672	Total 1689
Aircraft Capability[a]	24 Super Etendard; 7 Alize Total 31 fixed wing		
Helicopter Capability[a]	2 SA 365F Dauphin 2 Helicopters		
Notes: [a]These figures are based on the French operation of the Carrier are estimates of the likely Brazilian figures.			

Source: Adapted from Captain Richard Sharp, RN, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, (Jane's Information Group Limited: Surrey).

The Foch uses 1950s technology in its design and has an 8° angled deck with steam catapults. One catapult was installed forward, to port and the other on the angled deck. It was modified to operate the Super Etendard fighter bombers and received a new tactical data system, SENIT-2 which replaced SENIT-1, this work was carried out from July 1980 and August 1981. It was originally scheduled to remain in service

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until 1990 in the French Navy but Brazil purchased it in 2000. The Foch upon entering service with the Brazilian Navy, was renamed the São Paulo. It was transferred to the Brazilian Navy on November 15, 2000.

THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER VIRAAT

Speed	28 Knots		
Displacement	Standard: 23,900 tons Fully Loaded: 28,700 tons		
Range	5,040 miles at 20 knots		
Complement	Officers 143	Other Ranks 1,350	Total 1493
Aircraft	12 x Sea Harrier FRS 51		
Helicopter	7 x Sea King 42; 2 x Helix		
Notes: The refit included upgrades to the ship's propulsion systems, its radar suite, communications systems, elevator upgrades, and new weapon systems. Formerly HMS Hermes and could carry up to 30 aircraft.			

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998) and *Global Security*
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/r-viraat.htm,
(internet accessed) November 8, 2002

THE ADMIRAL GORSHKOV AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	32 Knots
Displacement	Standard: 38,000 tons Fully Loaded: 45,000-45,000 tons
Propulsion	8 turbopressurized boilers 4 steam turbines; 200,000 shp 4 shafts
Complement	1,200-1,600 including air group
Aircraft	12 or 13 Yak-38 Forger STOVL 14 to 17 Ka-25 Hormone or Ka-27/29 Helix

Source: Adapted from *Global Security*:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/r-viraat.htm,
(internet accessed) November 8, 2002

India

India currently has two aircraft carriers: the Viraat acquired from the Royal Navy in 1986, which is over forty years old; and the Admiral Gorshkov, a gift from Russia in 1999 provided that India pays for the

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modifications.[2]

The Viraat was converted to a STOVL carrier in 1980 and still has a ski-jump at the bow. The vessel was the replacement for the Viraat, which was decommissioned in 1997, though the Viraat may need to be

THE GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	30 Knots		
Displacement	Standard: 10,100 tons Fully Loaded: 13,370 tons		
Range	7,000 miles at 20 knots		
Propulsion	4 LM2500 gas turbines, 2 shafts, 80000 hp		
Complement	Ship's Company 555	Aircrew 201	Total 900
Aircraft	Up to 16 x AV-8B Harriers		
Helicopter	Up to 18 SH-3D Sea King		
Notes: Capable of being used in an amphibious role with a mix of Navy and Army helicopters			

Source: Adapted from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998) and Global Security:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/garibaldi.htm
(internet accessed) November 8, 2002

replaced by 2010 due to the vessel's extreme age. The Viraat operates 12 or 18 Sea Harriers and seven or eight Sea King or Kamov 'Hormone' antisubmarine warfare helicopters. In extreme situations it is capable of operating 30 Harriers. At present the Viraat carries a complement of Sea Harrier aircraft that are wired for Sea Eagle Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs) and Matra 550 Magic missiles. The Viraat underwent a major refit at the Cochin Shipyards during 1999 through April 2001. The refit extended the carrier's service life until 2010 and upgraded the ship's propulsion systems, its radar suite, communications systems, lift upgrades and new weapon systems. The Admiral Gorshkov is a Kiev Class Type 1143.4 and work began on its modifications at Severodvinsk in early 2000.

Italy

Italy has one aircraft carrier: the Giuseppe Garibaldi. The Garibaldi was designed to provide the necessary capacity of command and control

[2] Captain Richard Sharp, RN, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, (Jane's Information Group Limited: Surrey, 2000), p. 293.

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for the optimal use of the aircraft and anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile weapon systems. The carrier can operate ASW helicopters of advanced characteristics, along with medium helicopters for electronic warfare. The ship has the facilities required for the employment of the Harrier II AV-8B and aircraft in the role of anti-aircraft and anti-ship at distances greater than that provided by the indigenous shipboard missiles. The ship can accommodate up to 18 helicopters, specifically the Augusta Sikorsky SH-3D Sea King or the Augusta Bell AB212. The carrier can be configured to operate 16 AV-8B Harrier II aircraft fitted with the Maverick air-to-surface missile and the AMRAAM AIM-120 air-to-air missile, or a mix of helicopters and Harriers. It is planned to have the Nuova Unità Maggiore (NUM – New Major Unit), in service in 2007, when it will replace the Garibaldi.

THE PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	26 Knots			
Displacement	Fully Loaded: 17,188 tons			
Range	6,000 miles at 20 knots			
Complement	Ship' Company	Aircrew	Flag	Total
Officers	90	9		
Other ranks	465			
Totals	555	201	7	763
Propulsion	2 x GE LM 2500			
Aircraft	12 x EAV-8B Bravo (Harrier II/Harrier Plus)			
Helicopters	6-10 x SH3 Sea King; 2 x SH 60B Seahawk; 2-4 x AB-212			
Notes: Typical air wing 8 Bravos & 10 helicopters Total load 29 or 37 (including deck park) also carries 2 landing craft				

Source: Adaped from Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998) and *Global Security*:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/principe-de-asturias.htm, (internet accessed) November 8, 2002

Spain

Spain has one aircraft carrier: the Principe de Asturias, which was built in Banzan´s Shipyards and entered service on May 30, 1988. The air wing of the carrier can operate reconnaissance and long-range weapons in addition to providing both zone control capabilities and tactical possibilities of the wider Combat Group. It is, needless to say, the flag-

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ship of the Spanish Navy and the focal point of the Combat Group. The ski-jump of the Principe de Asturias is 12° slightly off the longitudinal axis, tilted portside to provide greater security to aircraft whilst taking off.

This also saves fuel and increases the payload capacity of the aircraft. The ski-jump and the stabilising fins permit the ship to function in adverse weather conditions. The air group is capable of operating up to 12 Harrier II AV-8B aircraft that are armed with AIM-9L Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles along with AGM-65E Maverick air-to-ground missiles in addition to the GAU-12 cannon. The carrier can also support up to 12 helicopters, normally six Sikorsky Sea King SH-3H, four Augusta AB-212 and two Sikorsky SH-3 AEW helicopters. The maximum operational capability of aircraft is 17 in the hangar deck and 12 in the flight deck.

THE CHAKRI NARUEBET AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Speed	26 Knots		
Displacement	Fully Loaded: 11,485 tons		
Range	10,000 miles at 12 knots		
Complement	Ship's Company	Aircrew	Total
	62		
Officers	393		
Other Ranks	455		
Total		146	601
Aircraft	6 x AV-8S Matador		
Helicopter	6 x Sea Hawk; Chinook capable		
Notes: It was built by Bazan Shipyard in Ferrol, Spain. Primary role is for search and rescue, although it is capable of being a general-purpose naval asset			

Source: Humphry Crum Ewing & Eric Grove, *Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection*, (Bailrigg Papers: Lancaster University, 1998)

Thailand

Thailand has one aircraft carrier: the Chakri Naruebet, although its primary purpose is for search and rescue. It came into service in August 1997.

Vulnerability of Aircraft Carriers

The nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War has seen a movement towards armed interventions. This has reduced the risk of enemy attacks, a risk that has often been regarded as constraining the

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power-projection capabilities that aircraft carriers provide. This has led some to foresee circumstances in which an aircraft carrier may be able to operate without the provision of an escorting battle group. A typical U.S. Navy battle group is comprised of one aircraft carrier, six surface combatants and two fast support ships. However, the British aircraft carriers in the Adriatic usually operated alone and there is no necessity that a carrier has to operate with other vessels in all operational circumstances. Furthermore, the organic air power that an aircraft carrier provides reduces the accompanying surface ship's vulnerability to a threat from air power and this enhances its capabilities.

As to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers, the large size of the ship, in the case of the United Kingdom's future carriers of around 50,000 tonnes, means that the damage inflicted by a single missile, or a limited number of missiles, is relatively small. The size and strength of an aircraft carrier has been shown to be itself a form of protection and it is unlikely that a carrier would be seriously damaged by missiles. The future aircraft carrier is being designed specifically so that it can operate (that is, launch aircraft) even after it has taken a number of hits. The performance rate of operations would, however, depend upon where the carrier had been hit and what systems had been disabled; but the relative size of the carrier affords it the ability to operate under fire after it has taken a number of hits.

Naval Swarms

The concept of a naval swarm involves a large number of small, lightly armed and agile platforms. This concept has its origins as far back as the Athenian fleet's victory over the Persian fleet in 480 BC and more recently by the German U-Boats' Wolf Pack tactics during the Battle of the Atlantic during the Second World War. The advancement of technologies in information technology, sensors, computing and telecommunications in the modern navy has led to the concept that more complex and better organised, and hence more effective, naval forces are possible. These technological advances in management information systems enhance the development of the swarm concept: they permit the initial dispersal of forces, the coalescing of those forces for an attack, and the reforming for a new wave. Most navies, including the Royal Navy, re-

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main vulnerable to this form of attack since they are reliant on a relatively few platforms and presently have no adequate protective measures. This is especially prescient for aircraft carriers.

The concept of a naval swarm comprises around 50 corvette-sized, fast, stealthy and lightly-crewed vessels that are digitised and interlinked with one another by means of one or two key weapon systems. The swarm operates by engulfing its target and overwhelming its defences and eliminating any seams in its formation that the enemy could exploit. The swarm is non-hierarchical in nature, which eradicates the time required to transfer orders and commands. It also possesses the agility to act more quickly than an opponent, and this is the key to the concept. The idea of the swarm derives elements from manoeuvre warfare and rests on the ability of the swarm commanders to focus on the achievement of the mission and not become bogged down with the minutiae of operations. The reconnaissance, combined with the networking, of combat systems amongst the swarm allows it to respond quickly to a rapidly-altering situation. The decentralisation of command permits the swarm to be almost self-sufficient, save for supplemental intelligence and the authorisation of the weapons.

Since the swarm vessels will rely on cheaper, smaller individual sensor systems and combine their reconnaissance and detection techniques, they will be able to cycle their radiating sensors and confuse an opponent's passive detection techniques. The investment required for the communication systems required by the swarm force would be offset by the light weapons system. A hypothetical swarm vessel "Sea Lance' is equipped with a 4 cell Harpoon/Stand-Off Land Attack Missile (SLAM) launcher, a small Vertical Launching System (VLS) surface-to-surface/air missile system and a 30mm gun. The networked swarm vessels would operate together to create an attack capability. A swarm's lower-cost weapon system individually would have a 50% probability of kill, but three combined would have an 87.5% probability compared with that of 85% of traditional weapon systems and eight would achieve a combined probability of 99.8%. The swarm concept has been tested in U.S. military exercises such as the U.S. Navy's "Fleet Experiment Bravo", the U.S. Army's "Army After Next" and more recently the U.S. Marine Corps' "Hunter Warrior", and "Urban Swarm". However, these

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exercises still appeared to rely on a few large platforms and did not completely embrace the concept of a swarm.

The swarm concept is not restricted to small corvette-sized platforms. Indeed non-state actors such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have operated in such a fashion. They have formed the Black Sea Tigers to operate suicide attacks using high-speed power boats to destroy Sri Lankan naval vessels and shipping, having acquired this weaponry from North Korea.

The swarm technique may be suited for attacking an aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier would be particularly vulnerable in a littoral region where a swarm force could operate most effectively. This would be especially true in the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The principal disadvantage of swarm operations is its inability to operate over long distances in adverse weather conditions, which present an inhospitable environment for both the vessels and the crew. One possible option to overcome this constraint is to use a carrier ship for the swarm force. This could allow the swarm force to operate on longer range missions.

Summary: The Future of Aircraft Carriers

Aircraft carriers proved to be extremely flexible weapon platforms throughout the 20th Century and even more recently in the recent conflict in Afghanistan. As we have seen, they have provided many roles and missions, which have included reconnaissance, power projection ashore, aerial combat, antisubmarine warfare. Their peacetime roles include a show of force and a demonstration of political resolve. It has become accepted for ships, and for aircraft carriers in particular, to make peacetime visits abroad, without somehow appearing to have a military mission. The same cannot be said for a visit of aircraft to foreign shores. Additionally, as the size of aircraft carriers has increased, so has the space available aboard the ship to operate command and control equipment, which has led to the aircraft carrier becoming the command and control ship for the battle group of ships. No longer is the aircraft carrier solely a means to project air power.

One of the most important qualities of aircraft carriers is that they do not require host-nation support to be able to deploy air power, unlike

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air bases in a foreign region. In the current international environment, host-nation support is often difficult to obtain, making aircraft carriers more important. The government of the United Kingdom, through the Strategic Defence Review, recognised the inherent flexibility of aircraft carriers in the current international security environment and determined that they would be invaluable assets, and indeed this was reaffirmed in the "New Chapter" to the SDR. In recognition that the current aircraft carriers would be out of service by 2012, the U.K. government embarked upon the procurement of their replacement. The three aircraft carriers would be replaced by two 50,000-tonnes-plus aircraft carriers. Given that the three Invincible-class aircraft carriers operationally had two available at any given occasion, with one in repair, there had effectively been only two aircraft carriers. The geographical location and global interests of the United Kingdom incline it towards naval power, and since aircraft carriers are fundamentally important to naval power, it is developing this capability.

The number of aircraft carriers procured by other countries is around nine. Of these, only the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia possess aircraft carriers of any substantial size, around 30,000-tonnes-plus. The United States has the largest number of aircraft carriers in the world, and they are identified in the table in that section. The rest of the carrier nations possess quasi-aircraft carriers that are capable of disembarking a relatively small number of aircraft and helicopters. These countries include India, Brazil, Italy, Spain and Thailand. The United Kingdom, by building two new 50,000-tonnes-plus aircraft carriers, would become part of the top echelon of aircraft carrier operating nations and consequently benefit from the political and military status that this offers.

The vulnerability of aircraft carriers is a particularly thorny issue. Whilst some experts on this topic believe that the size and sheer bulk of an aircraft carrier gives it a unique ability to operate despite taking a number of attacks from missiles, others consider them vulnerable. The use of naval swarms, small corvettes or high speed power boats, operating in high numbers to overwhelm the defences of an aircraft carrier and cause an aircraft carrier sufficient damage to render it inoperable, has been demonstrated by the Tamil Tigers against Sri Lankan naval vessels.

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By taking the decision to procure two new 50,000-tonnes-plus aircraft carriers, the United Kingdom has ensured that it will maintain an impressive power projection capability when its current class of aircraft carriers is decommissioned in 2012. Adding technological improvements to these two new aircraft carriers as they become available over their estimated fifty years' life span will enhance the United Kingdom's flexibility in meeting the military requirements of the changing international environment.

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Five Decades of Federal Initiatives Concerning School Desegregatory Effects: What Have We Learned?

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This article describes miscalculations as well as deliberate deceptions of legal, social science, governmental, judicial, and media leaders in appraising and reporting the impact of mandated desegregation, or forced busing, on the lives of students, families, communities, and the nation.[2, 3] Two central themes are advanced. First, forced busing was constructed around the simplistic environmental assumption that children would significantly benefit from attending racially balanced schools and that complex biophysical, environmental, emotional, genetic, and neurological influences warrant short shrift. Further, it is argued that little has been learned from the failure of school desegregation and that contemporary intervention programs, including tracking[4, 5] ongoing forced busing programs as well as

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[2] Throughout this paper the term "desegregation" refers to both voluntary and mandated programs to achieve racial balance; however court-ordered desegregation invariably was mandatory. Consistent with other studies probing desegregatory effects, this paper discusses emotional issues which can easily be misunderstood. The purpose of this paper is not to defend segregation but to provide an historical account which questions the ability of America's social scientists to objectify the impact of schooling reforms, especially when those concerns necessarily deal with racial themes. Further and reflecting linguistic and cultural shifts since initiation of desegregatory measures, the terms "Negro," "African-American," "Black," and "minority" are used interchangeably.

[3] Organizations, whether governmental, private or professional, are often wrongly assumed to be self-regulatory. Three years before Enron declared insolvency, an Arthur Andersen auditor warned of questionable accounting practices, a warning which was ignored (Schroeder, 2002) until external forces revealed a web of unethical practices.

[4] There is considerable evidence of bias within major governmental and philanthropic agencies. Research awards by the NIE, United States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) and other Federal agencies, invariably contain the statement "The research report herein was developed under a contract from the (NIE, etc.). However the contract does not necessarily reflect the position on policy of that agency, and no endorsement of their materials should be inferred." Despite such disclaimers, close examination reveals historic and ongoing bias. Lack of objectivity within academia is also well established and is linked to funding dynamics and cognitive constructs of awardees and researchers (Begley, 2002; Scott, 2000a; Stroufe, 1997). Weiss (1977) gathered responses from 60,000 social scientists and concluded that an

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President George W. Bush's "No Child Left Behind" initiative, will prove unproductive because they fail to recognize that the most fundamental forces of human learning lie beyond classroom reach.[6, 7]

Key Words: Ability grouping, Black education, Desegregation, Educational Reform, and School Desegregation

Origins of the Desegregation-Achievement Debate

Controversies concerning desegregation-achievement issues preceded the NIE investigation and stem from the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) citation of plaintiff's social science testimonies which Kenneth Clark collated into the Social Science Statement, later identified as

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overwhelming majority favored social changes such as forced busing and deemphasis on standardized testing. Similar trends persist in contemporary social science. Thus, Russo (2002) and McCain (2002) examined evidence of bias reflected in a 2001 poll of Ivy League professors, conducted by David Horowitz of the Center for the Study of Popular Culture. Further, publications of the such professional organizations as the American Psychological Association (APA) characteristically advance a pro-activist and anti-biological advocacy (Neisser, 1998; Scott, 2000b). In his presidential address before the American Educational Research Association Banks (1998) proposed that educators' greatest responsibilities are not to seek truth but to conduct studies which produce "greater social good." To reach that goal, Banks urged inclusion and the placement of students in the same instructional groups regardless of academic skills or aptitude. Additionally, Banks attacked standardized and aptitude tests as instructional instruments used by those who "seek to disempower marginal groups and groups of color."

[5] Kenneth Clark, who in *Brown* (1954) knowingly provided inaccurate information concerning academic benefits of school desegregation, and a former president of the American Psychological Association (APA) continues to be praised in the professional literature and in effect has threatened those who refused to proclaim desegregatory benefits which by all scientific standards are illusionary. Shortly after serving as APA president, Clark (1973) declared that social scientists who suggest biophysical influences may play a role in ethnic differences "...are providing public officials with rationalizations for regressive policies...thus becoming agents of injustice." Expanding on this theme, Clark stated "Social scientists must set up an apparatus to monitor scrupulously their own work and involvement in matters affecting social policy. They must assume the responsibility for protecting a gullible public from the seductive pretensions of scientific infallibility which are now increasingly being offered..."

[6] An established educational practice, tracking or inclusion involves placing students in instructional groups consistent with their contemporary ability to learn. As one illustration of harmful untracking effects and while teaching tenth grade Chicago students, Scott (1965) reported reading skills ranging from second grade through the first year of college. His request to group students on the basis of their (general) academic profiles was denied.

[7] A paper supported by the Ford Foundation and reviewed by Willis Hawley, (Mickelson 2001, p. 220-221) cites reports of the NAACP (1991) and Wells and Crain (1994) in concluding that when schools employ such practices as elimination of ability grouping and tracking "desegregation has clear (albeit modest) academic benefits for Black students and does no harm to Whites"; Mickelson further attributes lower achievement of minority students to tracking. Conversely, Scott (1981, 2001) concluded that disproportionate ethnic classroom composition frequently is based on sound educational and psychological policies inasmuch as more experienced as well as less experienced children learned more effectively when assigned challenging tasks on which they could be successful.

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Footnote Eleven of the decision.[8, 9] Relying on expert opinions expressed in that famous footnote, the Court ruled that racial separation adversely affected self-esteem, which reduced motivation and consequently retarded the "educational and mental development of Negro children."

In retrospect, it is quite astonishing that testimony contained in the now-famous footnote was not contested during the *Brown* hearings. Absence of constructive dialogue concerning the educational merits of desegregation, which ultimately impacted on hundreds of thousands of families, prompted Justice Felix Frankfurt to ask Thurgood Marshall, Chief NAACP Counselor, why plaintiff's claims of desegregatory educational benefits had not been challenged by defense experts. Marshall replied that no social scientist in the country would contest the NAACP position on educational issues (Kluger, 1976). In fact, Archibald Roberts, defendants' attorney in Prince Edward litigation which led to *Brown* (1954) found virtually all social scientists unwilling to testify for the defense. Their resistance was not based on compelling evidence of desegregation benefits: most feared that questioning merits of school desegregation might ruin their careers (Kluger, 1976).[10] Julian Stanley, President of the Division of Educational Psychology of the American Psychological Association, reported that most measurement specialists feared speaking out and those who did speak up were likely to be la-

[8] In *Brown* proceedings, Clark, and contrary to what he confided to NAACP attorneys, assured the Supreme Court that school integration would make up for all psychological and intellectual damage imposed on Black children by the crushing burden of Southern racist ideology (Kluger, 1976; Scott, 1977; Young and Bress, 1975a).

[9] Despite general acknowledgement that Clark's social science evidence as presented to the Supreme Court was erroneous and deliberately misleading, a former president of the American Educational Research Association concluded that Clark "...epitomizes the role of the socially responsible scholar in a democratic pluralistic society...he consistently opposed institutionalized structures that promoted racism and inequality and constructed scholarship that challenged existing knowledge systems and paradigms ...because education is a moral endeavor, educational researchers should be scientists as well as citizens committed to democratic ideals." (Banks, 1998). Banks' position prompts a very basic question: should social science focus on values or on truth? To raise this question is not to justify racism, segregation, or inequality but rather to determine the purpose and consequence of social science.

[10] As forced busing gained momentum, the editor of the *Journal of Clinical Psychology* remarked "...an increasing number of students are being brainwashed by extremist psychologists who go far beyond anything scientific in their advocacy of political activities..." (Thorne, 1974).

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beled racists or at least illiberal.[11, 12] Eventually Henry Garrett, former President of the American Psychological Association and a professor at Columbia University, agreed to testify for the defendants; he later documented bias exerted by university administrators because he testified for the defense (Kluger, 1976).

Precedent having been established by the *Brown* decision, lower courts subsequently ignored ecological and biological/genetic variables, and concluded that the generally lower academic profiles of groups of minority children are attributable to unequal educational opportunities. Emphasis was placed on what occurred *within* schools. Judge John Minor Wisdom (*Cunningham v. Jefferson County Board of Education,* 1966) ordered what some authorities considered the most important doctrinal changes since *Brown* by declaring Negroes "collectively harmed" by segregated schools (Read, 1975). This ruling shifted *de jure* desegregation rulings, designed to assure Black children their constitutional rights to attend neighborhood schools, to quite another level. Brown drew upon discredited social science and set the stage for *de facto* school desegregation based on the assumed right of Black children to equal educational *outcomes*. The Court assumed that appropriate racial balance, implemented through mandated dismantling of neighborhood schools, would narrow if not eliminate the Black-White achievement gap. In *Hobsen v.Hansen* (1971), Judge J. Skelly Wright concluded "[r]acially and socially homogeneous schools damage the minds and spirits of all children in lower tracks for reduced education based on (inappropriate) tests, thus implementing the self fulfilling prophecy inherent in such misjudgments ... all have contributed to the increase in crime, particularly in juvenile crime. The scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child, Negro and White, is strongly related to the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body..." In *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg* (1971), Judge McMillan declared that segregation explained the lower achievement of blacks. The shift toward mandated

[11] The defense not only dealt with social scientists' apprehension over testifying that busing might not be beneficial; they were refused opportunities to question NAACP experts (Carmichael, P.A. as cited in Carter, J.D. 1973, p. 28.

[12] For more recent documentation of punishments social scientists have experienced and continue to experience for objectifying desegregatory effects, see Mitchell, J. V. (1970), Pollock (2001), and Scott (2002).

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educational *outcomes* became more pronounced following *Milliken v. Bradley* (1974), which rendered lower academic performance of African-American students central to segregatory redress offenses. In that decision, experts on both sides testified that desegregation would enhance Black achievement (Wolf, 1977a, p. 101).

Confusion in the Courts

As busing progressed judges grew distrustful of social scientists, whose leaders seemed incapable of presenting objective data (Wilkinson, 1979; Scott, 1981b). Despite "expert" predictions of desegregation benefits, schools reported district-wide unchanging or even declining test scores. In *Hart v. Community School Board* (1974), the federal district court judge remarked "... much of the current research replies to precise policy-based questions with the ambiguity of Delphic Oracle ..." Judge W. E. Doyle (1977) fired still another a warning shot over the bow of academia and concluded that "...school desegregation rulings are not based on social science evidence but on fundamental percepts, moral, positive law and reason." Judge John Minor Wisdom (1975) did a turnabout, virtually declared a shunning of social science, and stated that social science "appears to have had no effect on the most recent desegregated decisions of the 1970s" and that social scientists played no role in *Brown* and subsequent court rulings. Desegregation, declared Judge Wisdom, is a matter of law not social science or sociology.[13]

An Issue Beyond Control of the General Accounting Office

Inconsistent judicial rulings puzzled and angered school personnel, parents, and the general public. Responding to Congressional concerns the General Accounting Office (GAO), which serves as the primary check on accountability in government, initiated an investigation into the effects of desegregation on learning of minority children. David Zylks, a member of the GAO's civil rights audit group, denied that the proposed study was triggered by a recent United States Civil Rights

[13] Within legal circles, doubts concerning the desegregation-achievement thesis declined still further. In 1985 the American Bar Association awarded its Silver Gavel to Raymond Wolters, whose book *The Burden of Brown-Thirty Years of School Desegregation* contends not only that many Blacks opposed busing but that desegregation rulings based on "expert" opinion have created loss of creditability concerning the judicial process. Not withstanding ABA's praise, Wolters was faulted for being racist (Williams, 1985).

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Commission (USSCR) report. He nonetheless acknowledged that some Commission members charged that the USCCR report was intentionally biased to support mandated busing. Zylks stressed that the GAO is insulated from political coercion and considers the subject of school desegregation inadequately covered and that GAO "can make a contribution by shedding light on the subject" (Eisner, 1976). Endel Kaseoru of the GAO's audit unit telephoned Scott to obtain empirical data (Personal Correspondence, Kaseoru to Scott, December 3, 1976). Several years later the GAO inquiry was halted, and Scott wrote to Kaseoru. In response, Joseph J. Englin, Jr., Assistant GAO Director, acknowledged that the agency had attempted to "alleviate the controversy surrounding school desegregation", but concluded it could not make an effective contribution to the school desegregation issue. (Personal Correspondence, Englin to Scott, October 4, 1979) [14]

Following jettisoning of the GAO audit, courts continued to issue rulings which further undermined confidence in the law. A Grand Rapids, Michigan judge ruled in favor of various school desegregation remedies which, in nearby Kalamazoo, another judge declared unconstitutional; the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both judgments (*Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education*). Separately and in 1982, that same Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the decision of a district court judge who ruled that desegregation only marginally enhanced black learning profiles and declared that desegregation does much more and "raises the level of black achievements" (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 687 F 2nd 814). In 1984 and while results of the 1982 NIE study

[14] In a roundabout manner, the GAO *did* reach preliminary conclusions prior to formally announcing the aborted attempt at examining desegregation achievement effects. At the request of Congressman Carl D. Perkins, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Elementary and Vocational Education, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, the Comptroller General of the United States commented "...Some studies indicate that SES explains more variance in achievement levels than quality of education afforded." This suggests that, had the GAO formally completed its announced study, results would very probably have indicated that forced busing was an unproductive approach to enhancing learning profiles of African-American students. Further, the GAO study submitted its conclusion to Congressman Perkins' subcommittee in the form of a paper entitled, "Better criteria needed for awarding grants for school desegregation." This statement cites "serious questions" about the adequacy of program management. Grants were awarded to ineligible school districts, federal agencies failed to question inconsistencies between panelist comments and numerical scores, and there was a breakdown between schools funded and supported desegregation activities (Comptroller General of the United States, 1977).

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were being disseminated, a Virginia district court heard conflicting expert testimony, elected not to "balance the experts," and made no findings concerning desegregatory achievement outcomes. (*Riddick v. School Board*, 1984)

The Coleman Report: Unexpected Findings

As courts wrestled with issues involving desegregatory remedies, the USDE funded the famous Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966). Designed to statistically document large differences in educational resources of White and Black schools and hence the need for desegregation, the Report astonished educational and legal communities by failing to discern resource disparities associated with ethnicity. Student achievement, Coleman concluded, was more dependent on family than on race or schooling issues.[15] Were this true, basic assumptions underlying *Brown* and dozens of other desegregation cases required reappraisal. The USDE and other governmental agencies challenged, disparaged, or sought to suppress Coleman's report (Cohen & Weiss, 1977; Glass, 1976). Surprised at efforts by influential informational and educational media channels to conceal or obfuscate findings of the Coleman Report, Senator Daniel Mohnihan (1969) remarked "... even modest public awareness of busing failures came about under the influence of persons and institutions at best peripheral to the world of American education." Troubled by mounting public doubt of compensatory benefits which focused on schools and suggested that African-American children are more likely to benefit from parental involvement and programs dealing with such biological factors as prenatal risk factors than from busing, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (USDHEW) published a 346-page report (Ornstein, 1975). That report detailed what researchers might do if they received federal funding. The core ideas were simple: ignore explanatory reasons for the racial achievement gap; simply assume injustice prevails if ethnic academic achievement levels are not ethnically uniform.

Coleman's pivotal findings questioned some of the most basic

[15] Mayeske and Beaton (1975) completed a USDE funded and four-volume study of the influence of student social background and school characteristics. Consistent with Coleman's findings, they concluded that when home background factors were controlled, race and ethnicity explained only a tiny fraction of the achievement variance.

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premises of *Brown:* if neither inter-school ethnic composition nor level of resources significantly affected Black learning trends, then most of the Black-White achievement gap had to be explained by influences *outside* the school. After his findings came under fire, Coleman (1968) reversed himself and declared that Black achievement rose in schools attended by a majority of whites (Young and Bress, 1975b). Challenged on this by Dyer (1968), Coleman (1978) eventually shifted positions and acknowledged that desegregation had not produced gains. Further, Coleman expressed regret that he once argued in Court(s) that desegregation would produce academic achievement. Busing-related desegregatory achievement gains, he declared, are "fiction" and social science results are weapons that will be used by whichever side they favor (Cohen & Weiss, 1977).[16, 17]

Research: Are There any "Experts"?

Despite unresolved controversies provoked by the Coleman Report, courts continued to rely on desegregation as a central remedial option for segregatory offenses. The USCCR, NIE and the USDHEW funded publications which presumably demonstrated dramatic desegregation-linked achievement gains (Holden, 1974; USCCR, 1967; USCCR, 1972; USCCR, 1974; Weinberg, 1977).[18] Those studies invariably concluded

[16] Mickelson (2001, p. 219) draws upon outdated statistics and claims that Coleman concluded that Blacks derive educational benefits from attending desegregated schools.

[17] Separately and in late 2001, and as an indirect endorsement of the original Coleman Report which emphasized the cardinal role of factors outside the home to learning, some civil rights activists launched a concerted effort to close the achievement gap between Black and Hispanic students and their White peers. The new emphasis, wholly consistent with the Coleman Report, focused not on desegregation but on broad environmental forces outside the school, primarily parents (Associated Press (2001) *Waterloo Courier*, August 22, A2). Ironically, in the early 1970s and although Federal and State funding had already been budgeted, Scott was dismissed as Director of Home Start, one of two national programs funded by the U.S. Department of Education, which focused on helping poor minority and majority parents more effectively teach their own children (Scott, 1968-1975). Why the firing? Scott had testified that minority children learn more effectively if busing were deemphasized and central focus placed on facilitating parental skills.

[18] Political tensions within the USCCR intensified as Reagan appointees questioned busing benefits. Orfield (1985), a venerable supporter of desegregation, resigned from the five member USCCR panel charged with supervising the Commission's prepared desegregation study and expressed concern that his colleagues, Professors Christine Rossell and Douglas Longshore "no longer guide the project." (Personal Correspondence to C. Pendleton, USCCR Chairman, October 25, 1985). Orfield was also troubled about roles assigned to David Armor and Michael Ross, whose research "questioned the educational value of desegregation" and also expressed concern about Max Green who, in Orfield's words, has presented a "continual problem" and "is

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that busing raised Black achievement profiles. By the late 1970s, however, some scholars reported ambiguous desegregation achievement outcomes (Bradley & Bradley, 1977; Scott, 1977; St. John, 1975). From these studies a stable theme emerged: the more rigorous the studies, the less persuasive the evidence of academic gains.

Over time, a gap widened between alleged desegregatory benefits and the actual impact of busing on students, families and school districts. Public confidence in courts and social science progressively eroded; both Black and White opposition to busing increased (Armor, 1973; Kirp, Yudof, & Levin, 1992; United States Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Supplemental Views, 1982; Young and Bress, 1975a; Wolf, 1977b).[19] Doubters of busing benefits extended to the upper judiciary levels. On January 21, 1980, the Supreme Court returned a Dallas school desegregation case to a lower federal court. Three justices – William Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, and Lewis Powell – cited evidence that busing caused white-flight, resegregated schools, hurt the quality of education, and declared, "the case presents a long needed opportunity to reexamine the considerations relevant to framing a remedy in a desegregation suit" (USCCR Update, 1980). Ironically, as the three Justices made those tempering statements, Ernest Boyer, Commissioner in the Office of Education appeared before the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations and identified school desegregation as a budget priority (Department of Labor and Health, Education and Wel-

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strongly committed to the Reagan Administration's Civil Rights policies." Subsequently Clarence Pendelton wrote to Orfield, expressed concern regarding "serious charges about an important Commission study" and asked Orfield to directly discuss with the Commissioners questions he had raised in the press; Orfield declined (Personal Correspondence, December 3, 1985). Three years later and in 1988, political winds within the USCCR shifted. Over objections of the USCCR administration, a slight majority of the Commission, supported by media giants such as Gannett Corporation, launched a campaign opposing "the high proportion of white males" serving as Chairs of the 50 USCCR State Advisory Commissions: most of the Chairs favored Reagan mandates and opposed busing. Debates over desegregatory educational issues persist and Goldstein (2002) considers the USCCR reduced to irrelevance because of "political squabbles" embedded in contradictory claims based on social science; USCCR Chairman Mary Frances Berry, who vigorously espoused forced busing over several decades, recently lost her court challenge seeking to refuse President Bush's anti-busing appointee to the eight member Commission (Commissioner Kirsanow 2002).

[19] Significant Black opposition to desegregation is no longer contested (Polling the Country, 1977; Raspberry, 1998; Scott, 2000a; Vitullo-Martin, 1998; Yoo & George, 1998; Scott, 2002).

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fare Appropriations, 1980).

Busing and Politics: The Reagan Era

School busing played a prominent role in President Reagan's election and some newly appointed Federal officials openly doubted alleged benefits of forced busing. Incoming USDE officials established a new research priority: clarifying the extent to which desegregation enabled Blacks to more effectively learn. As one small step in that direction, Scott (1983a) was awarded a USDE grant designed to appraise desegregatory-achievement effects.[20] Focusing on microanalysis, or examination of the patterning of details which comprised specific investigations, Scott was unable to identify a single study which documented viable evidence of significant longitudinal African-American achievement gains attributable to desegregation.

Congress Intervenes

Approximately a quarter century after the *Brown* decision, during the waning days of the Carter administration, and responding to mounting public disenchantment with desegregation and evidence of surveys conducted by the Carnegie Commission which linked busing and increased racial hostility, intimidation, and violence (Weiss, 1977; Young & Bress, 1975a; Scott, 1977), Congress held several hearings which weighed in on the desegregation-achievement premise.

Busing issues held center stage in hearings of the United States Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, from December 1977 to March 1978, which involved refunding of the USCCR. The USCCR had funded studies which consistently reported achievement gains accruing from desegregation, results which were disseminated to the general public. At those hearings, Meyer Weinberg and Robert Crain testified that Black students' academic achievement rose significantly under desegregatory conditions.[21] Conversely, and relying

[20] Commenting on Scott's final report, a USDE Management Analyst remarked "...The question you raise as to whether the hypothesis, i.e., the authenticity of the busing-higher school achievement can be clearly answered is a valid one. If not that, what form of genuine education help can be offered to America's most vulnerable youth?" (Personal Correspondence, P. A. Allen, 1983, February 25.)

[21] Testimonies of Crain, Hawley, and Weinberg impacted on numerous Court rulings. The three researchers periodically coordinated efforts with like-minded academics and governmental officials including Mary Berry, long time member of the USSCR, an ardent advocate of forced

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on microanalysis, Scott demonstrated major flaws of studies funded by the USCCR, NIE, and USDE. Some senators expressed particular interest in USCCR-supported research which claimed significant achievement benefits from desegregation in 10 major school districts (*New York Times*, 1973; Heckinger, 1974).[22] Commenting on that study, Scott summarized his direct contacts with all 10 superintendents (Personal Communication, August 29 and September 24, 1974): not one had affirmed USCCR claims. Typical was the response of Tampa Florida's superintendent, Raymond Shelton (Personal Correspondence, September 24, 1974): "There are no such statistics. I can't imagine the U.S. Commission making such a statement." D. P. Whitmer, Superintendent of Pontiac, Michigan schools replied that he is "at a loss to know where the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights got information that leads to this conclusion." (Personal Correspondence, September 5, 1974).

Early in the Reagan era, a second Congressional hearing (Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1981) focused more directly on court-ordered school busing. Hawley, Weinberg, Crain, Scott and others testified on desegregation-achievement effects. Considerable discussion centered on the seven year project underwritten by the USCCR and the NIE, conducted by Willis Hawley and other educators at Vanderbilt University

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busing, and currently Director of the USCCR. With such networking and after coodinating their efforts, Crain, Hawley, and Weinberg garnered numerous Federal grants from the NIE, Office of Civil Rights and the Ford Foundation (Weinberg, 1968, 1977, 1983; Hawley, et al 1981a, 1981b, 1983). Predictably, the three have reported academic gains linked to desegregation; other researchers, typically working without Federal or philanthropic funding were unable to document such gains (Bradley & Bradley, 1977; Chandler, 1977: Cook, 1984a; Rivkin, 2000; Scott, 1977; Scott 1983b).

[22] The questionable study funded by the USCCR had taken a circuitous route which included wide media coverage and eventually a statement in the 1974 Yearbook of the World Book Encyclopedia (Heckinger, 1974) which declared that desegregation had produced higher educational achievement in ten cities. During the 1970s, Scott requested raw data from the USCCR. W. T. White, Assistant to the USCCR Staff Director for Congressional and Public Affairs, responded that "educational gains...are long term results that most communities realize (Personal Correspondence, October 17, 1979) and advised Scott to write to Dr. Willis Hawley at the Institute for Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University. Scott's letter to Hawley drew a response from Ronald D. Henderson (Personal Correspondence, November 9, 1979), Team Leader of the Desegregation Studies of the NIE, who suggested that Scott contact Robert Crain of the Center for Social Organization of Schools.

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(1979, 1980,1981a, 1981b, 1983).[23] In those hearings, Scott noted that federal guidelines specified that the purpose of the program was designed "to improve potential benefits of desegregation." Clearly, that phrasing effectively eliminated from grant consideration any open-ended proposals which permitted an aspiring applicant to consider as one option the strengthening of neighborhood schools, or that school desegregation was unhelpful or counterproductive. Scott also summarized his contacts with school officials responsible for research in three school districts from which Hawley and his team had drawn data: Charlotte, Nashville-Davidson County, and Louisville. Not one director was able to provide evidence of long term achievement gains associated with desegregation.[24]

In the early 1980's, a House of Representatives' subcommittee held a series of hearings on desegregation issues (United States Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitution Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, together with Supplemental Views, House of Representatives, 1982); only two social scientists were invited, Weinberg and Crain: both had extensive histories of publishing dubious busing benefits.[25] Citing Weinberg's testimony, the House Subcommittee concluded that "...as measured by standardized scholastic achievement tests, the evidence is compelling that in almost all cases black students have done significantly better in desegregated schools..."(p. 10). Further, the Subcommittee approvingly cited Crain's statement that "across the Nation Black test scores have been rising markedly and faster than white scores in the past years..."

Although noting Norman Miller's reference to methodological weaknesses of desegregation studies, the Subcommittee concluded that

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[23] Contributors to the project, as headed by Hawley, included R. Mahard, W. Weinberg, N. Chachkin, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, S. Robinson of the National Educational Association, P. Roos, Director of Education Litigation, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and Mary Berry whose advocacy for desegregation and affirmative action led, in 2002, to bitter infighting in the USCCR (Goldstein, 2002).

[24] Findings of Hawley and colleagues were reported before and after the hearings. Chester Finn (1981), Professor of Education and Public Policy at Vanderbilt, questioned Hawley's conclusions and cited evidence of negative educational outcomes from school desegregation in Nashville-Davidson County.

[25] The Committee heard only one side of desegregatory-achievement issues, as presented by Crain and Weinberg.

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"the overwhelming consensus among researchers is that test scores of minority students in desegregated schools usually increase, particularly when certain factors are present – desegregation beginning in the first grade and involving a significant percentage of middle class students" (p.12). Further, the three minority Republican Congressmen on the Subcommittee contributed a "Supplemental View" which, while not directly referring to research involving desegregatory academic effects, alleged that busing introduces "...resultant academic deterioration which can only be heightened by high teacher turnover and diminished financial resolve."

The Reagan Administration and NIE Policy Shifts

Reagan's election had revealed public shifts against busing. Concerned about those shifts, officials in some Federal agencies feared that desegregatory programs were imperiled. Responding to that perceived danger the USCCR (1981) released a monograph (With all Deliberate Speed; 1954-1980) which commented on decisions by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in four pending cases. The Commission's monograph stated that "DOJ's postures appear to reflect a change on policy which cannot help but be of deep concern to those who believe that, as the Supreme Court found in *Brown v. Board of Education*, segregated facilities are inherently unequal."

Despite resistance of USCCR officials, the incoming NIE administration pressed ahead with questions concerning desegregatory effects. President Reagan designated the National Council on Educational Research (NCER) to review NIE's 1981-82 grant and contract awards (Schneider, 1990).[26] The NCER concluded that NIE typically had funded researchers whose predispositions essentially precluded objectivity concerning some of the nation's most complex social and educational issues. NIE officials replied that the agency had historically given little attention to the desegregatory impact of school desegregation, which was considered a legal and not educational issue (Henderson, von

[26] Responding to the political nature of desegregation issues, Reagan dismissed USCCR Chairman Arthur Flemming and Commissioner Horn, and replaced them with Clarence Pendelton and Mary Louise Smith (USCCR Update, 1981).

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Euler & Schneider, 1981; Schnieder, 1990).[27]

Some USDE Reagan appointees sought information from researchers not involved in Federal desegregation research during Democratic administrations, and Scott's focus on microanalysis caught their attention. Applying microanalysis as one empirical vehicle, USDE positioned desegregation into a somewhat different frame: Did forced busing or *de facto* desegregation authentically promote long-term African-American academic achievement? If so, how can desegregatory practices be further improved, but if not, how then can more viable educational remedies be formulated and implemented?

Origins of the NIE Inquiry

Following several telephone calls with USDE officials, Scott conferred in Washington with Robert Sweet, Associate Director of the USDE in March 1982. Later, the discussion group was enlarged to include Thomas Ascik, Research Associate and Associate NIE Director, and Jeffrey Schneider, Team Leader of the NIE Desegregation team."[28] Initial discussion focused on the quality of existing research and the potential value of microanalysis in assessing empirically strong studies which, collectively, might yield an objective assessment of desegregatory achievement effects. Subsequently Schneider and Scott met in Washington from May 16 to 21, 1982 and again May 29 to June 6, 1982. During those discussions, procedures for implementing the project were outlined and Scott was designated Academic Advisor to the Desegregation Team. His charge was to assist other panelists in employing microanalysis, maintaining focus on empirical facts, and reducing ideological bias.

The NIE Panel: Initial Steps

Schneider and Scott's first major task involved selection of a panel of social scientists who had comprehensively examined desegregatory-

[27] In 1968, the USDE governing body of what later became the NIE, financed an extensive assessment of desegregatory achievement effects by Meyer Weinberg. NIE also funded Weinberg's subsequent investigations (1977, 1983) which claimed large desegregatory achievement benefits. Further, Weinberg (1983) notes that Oscar Uribe and Mary von Euler served as his NIE program (project) officers.

[28] As initial papers were formulated, Schneider was reassigned to the U.S. Defense Department; however, he agreed to remain with NIE through project completion. During the final steps of the undertaking, Oscar Uribe was named Acting Leader of the Desegregation Team.

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achievement outcomes. To assure theoretical diversity and avoid possible allegations of politicalization, panelists were chosen whose research reported positive, negative, and neutral desegregatory-achievement outcomes. Selectees were Robert Crain and Paul Wortman (Positive); David Armor and Norman Miller (Negative), and Herbert Walberg and Walter Stephen (Neutral). Additionally, Thomas Cook served as methodologist and primary statistical analyst; he and Scott were to encourage panel members to focus on facts as reported in empirically strong studies and to facilitate synthesis of panel conclusions.

Following a series of telephone calls, the panel assembled in Washington on July 30, 1982, and agreed to study achievement outcomes in two academic domains: reading (verbal) and math. Initial concern centered on identification of the most empirically rigorous studies, and 27 "negative" criteria were established. An experiment containing any one of these markers was eliminated from consideration for inclusion in the "core" set of studies. However, and over objections by Schneider and Scott, most panelists insisted on the option of adding or deleting studies from the agreed upon "core" (Cook, 1984a; Ingram, 1990). Individual panelists subsequently included experiments which other panelists considered profoundly flawed.[29]

Effect Size: The Central Desegregatory Criterion

Panelists agreed to rely primarily on effect size (ES) as the measure of influence on learning as exerted by the variable under investigation, school desegregation. The well-known Wechsler IQ tests, for example, are normed on the basis of an average of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. An effect size of .1 on the Wechsler would, therefore, reflect an increase of 1.5 IQ points for American students in general (10% of 15 IQ points). The issue becomes somewhat more complex when dealing with

[29] Cordray (1990) considered the NIE study compromised because panelists analyzed different subtests of core studies, and differed in both how they calculated ES and how they used different control groups as the basis of their comparisons (pp 109-110). Mickelson (2001) cites Cook's (1984a) statement that "in retrospect, the decision to restrict the selection criteria to a common set rather than let panelists select their own, and the failure to assess each of Crain's studies according to the Panel's criterion, may have unnecessarily restricted both the sample of students and the heterogeneity in assumptions on which the theory behind the use of multiple panelists depends (Mickelson 2001, p. 244). However Cook also noted that ".... calls were heard to add to other studies" and "it is not difficult to see why the decision was made to restrict the meta analysis to "better studies." (p. 39).

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(group) national ethnic differences: Armor noted that the Black standard deviation is about .7 that of whites. Therefore, a .1 ES increment (it is recognized that IQ is generally considered less malleable than achievement) would raise the average black IQ from about 85 to 86. Even if an ES of .1 were obtained and be statistically significant, few knowledgeable observers would conclude that a change of this magnitude produces practical benefits.[30] Initially 157 studies, considered most influential in the professional literature were examined. Only 18 experiments, increased to 19 and reduced to 17 by some panelists, met the relatively crude requirements for inclusion into the "core."[31]

Panelists registered sharp disagreements with respect to both procedures and findings. Consensus could not be reached concerning ES values. Crain and Walberg opted not to rely on the pooled mean ES; the remaining four panelists provided ES estimates which differed in the number and cases for which ES were secured and examined.

Stability of Panelists' Perceptions of Desegregation Effects

Despite an initial design which called for standardizing empirical analyses, panelists followed independent courses and the NIE experience did not change opinions regarding desegregatory achievement effects[32] (Cook, 1984a; Ingram, 1990).

Consistent with their pre-panel perspectives, the two "Positive" panelists, Crain and Wortman, concluded that desegregation yielded positive achievement gains. Thus Crain (1983, 1984) cited Glass' re-

[30] During NIE panel discussions, Miller provided an ES example within the domain of achievement: the ES he found "translated into the rather trivial increase" of about eight points on the typical *SAT* college entrance test which has a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Moreover, his calculation doesn't control for the greater restriction observed in black variance.

[31] Wachter and Straf (1990) considered the sharp reduction in number of studies which satisfied even modest empirical standards, 157 to 19, a reflection of overall poor quality of desegregatory research. Further, the panel agreed, as Wortman (1984) noted "...all individual studies have serious flaws..."

[32] In examining the issue of attitudinal flexibility of NIE panelists, Cooper (1990, p. 87) compared perceptual changes of NIE participants and of graduate students who examined the final NIE summaries. Graduate students showed greater flexibility and their perceptions of positive desegregatory effects dropped "precipitously" after reading NIE reviews (p.18). Conversely, views of NIE panelists were less malleable. In explaining the greater inflexibility of NIE panelists, Cooper noted that they began their task with considerable earlier knowledge. This, he averred, "lessens the possibility of change in basic beliefs" because cognitive schemas are well established and resistive to integration of contradictory new information (p.87).

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search (1977), considered all relevant literature superior to data used in the core investigations, and averred that the studies he included, and which the panel rejected, were "better than the average panel's selections."[33] Therefore he reviewed outcomes from the 93 studies which he and Mahard (1982) had previously analyzed, focused on 20 studies, concluded that desegregation promotes higher African-American achievement outcomes, and pursued that the argument (Crain, 1984). Other panelists discarded all but one of the 20 studies Crain emphasized; they questioned whether desegregation studies are equally rigorous, and doubted Crain's assumptions of random busing effects.

Acknowledging serious flaws in all NIE case studies, Wortman (1984), estimated a two month gain for desegregated students, but acknowledged no effect for either duration of desegregation or cumulative desegregatory effects. Of the other three panelists who provided ES estimates on the core studies (Armor, Miller, Stephen), Wortman provided by far the largest ES in both reading and math; his collective ES estimate for reading was .28, whereas estimates of the other three panelists were .06, 15, and .16. For math Wortman offered an ES of .23, compared to .00, .01 and .06 of the other three panelists (Miller, 1984). In a subsequent paper Wortman & Bryant (1985), reported that "the NIE Core Studies had an overall ES of .25 standard deviation."

Views of Armor and Miller, the "negatives" also remained unchanged. Working with data from the NIE core studies, Armor (1984) estimated the average reading ES at .06, and .01 for math, considered neither statistically significant, and concluded there was no consistent evidence of desegregatory-achievement benefits. He speculated that some of the reported modest gains were either spurious or attributable to creative educational programming. Miller (1984) reported his findings separately and also collaborated with Carlson in the NIE Report (Miller & Carlson, 1984). They concluded that racial balance is probably not a direct casual factor in production of the small positive effects that the panel observed. Nonetheless, they asserted that school desegregation should be encouraged if it does not enhance Black learning because

[33] Ingram (1990) noted that Crain's inclusion of studies beyond the NIE "core" studies markedly influenced the data he reported.

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it may increase intergroup acceptance; this, of course, was not an issue the panel was asked to examine.

Attitudes of the "neutrals" also reflected attitudinal stability with slight movement toward the "negative." Stephen (1984) reported an estimated .15 ES for reading and .00 for math and observed that Black reading achievement declined in all four "core" studies involving mandated desegregation. He considered the small ES_s unreliable because of such variables as limited sample size, unreliability of measures, questionable quality of achievement measure, and attrition. Desegregatory impacts on achievement, Stephen wrote, may be caused by conditions unrelated to racial balance such as student motivation and quality of instruction. Concurring with Stephen, Walberg (1984) compared desegregatory effects to meta analysis for other educational programs designed to improve academic performance and reported that school desegregation lacks promise in the size and consistencies of learning effects. His primary conclusion: reforms other than desegregation are more effective in enhancing black achievement.

Cook (1984a), the methodologist, remarked that the modest ES_s secured through analyses of the "core" studies lacked practical significance; the ES_s were small and central data were based on about 17 studies whose generalizability is "unknown". He also noted wide interrater ES variability, even though panelists drew data from the same sources, as well as problems accruing from an unknown distribution of means for school districts whose populations were unknown. With these reservations, Cook listed eight conclusions:

(1) "Desegregation did not cause any decrease in black achievement,

(2) "On the average, desegregation did not cause an increase in achievement in mathematics,

(3) "Desegregation increased mean reading levels. The gain reliably differed from zero and was estimated to be between two and six weeks across the studies examined. Only one panelist (Stephen, 1984) computed the reading effect per 8-month school year. His estimate is between five and six weeks of gain per year. But since none of the studies involved more than three years of post-

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desegregation research, it is not possible to compute the mean gain over a child's total school career in desegregated classrooms,

(4) "The *median* gains were almost always greater than zero but were lower than the means and did not reliably differ from zero. The *modal* gains were even less than the median gains and varied around zero,

(5) "The differences between the means, medians, and modes result because the distribution of reading effects appears to be skewed, with a disproportionate number of school districts seeming to obtain atypically high gains,

(6) "Studies with the largest reading gains can be tentatively characterized along a number of methodological and substantive dimensions, including: small sample sizes, the study of two or more years of desegregation, desegregated children who outperformed their segregated counterparts even before desegregation began, and desegregation that occurred earlier in time, involved younger students, was voluntary, had larger percentages of whites per school, and was associated with enrichment programs,

(7) "None of the above factors can be isolated, singly or in combination, as causes of any of the atypically large achievement gains in reading that were obtained in some school districts,

(8) "The panel examined only 19 studies of desegregation, with most panelists rejecting at least two of them on methodological grounds. When the results for each study (or each comparison) are plotted for reading or mathematics, the distributions are based on so few observations that I could not accept the assumption that the obtained distributions closely approximate what the underlying population distributions are. Because of the small samples and apparently non-normal distributions, little confidence should be placed in any of the mean results presented earlier. I have little confidence that we know much about how desegregation affects reading on the average and, across the few studies examined, I find

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the variability in effect sizes more striking and less well understood than any measure of central tendency." [34, 35]

Microanalysis of ES Profiles

Sharing Cook's concern about variability, Scott (1983b) examined ES profiles. For the four panelists who employed ES estimates and as summarized by Miller and Carlson (1984) there were 11 positive and eight negative ratings concerning reading whereas in math there were eight positive, eight negative and three unscored or 0. Mean ES_s were reading +.156 and math +.053. In a separate paper Miller (1984) cited his earlier coauthorship with Carlson (Cook, 1984a) and reported ES_s of the Anderson study, reading and math, at .73 and 69 respectively; for the Zdep investigation, the reported ES_s were .67 for reading and -.16 for math. Stephen's ES_s (Cook,1984a) constituted 23 positive and 10 negative ES estimates in reading with 14 ES_s .10 or less. Further, Miller (1984) summarized ES_s of the four panelists who employed the ES metric, and noted wide inter-rater differences.

Virtually all reports concerning the NIE investigation fail to note a critical finding: high mean estimates on the Anderson (1966) and Zdep (1971) studies skewed overall NIE results. Without those two studies, the mean ES_s would have been negative in the critically important reading domain. On the Anderson investigation, Miller and Carlson (1984) reported mean ES estimates of +.75 and +.49 in reading and math respectively whereas for the Zdep study comparable figures were +.63 and -.16. For the Anderson study (1984) Wortman's mean ES estimates (Wortman & Bryant, 1985) were: +.63 and +.59 in reading and math respectively; comparable ES estimates concerning the Zdep investigation were +.34 and -.15. Stephan's reading and math estimates for the Anderson study were .42 and .24 respectively; his comparable figures

[34] Mirroring Cook's concerns, Press (1990) noted there were "...no standard errors for average ES for the meta analysis, nor were there any determination of standard errors. Therefore we cannot know whether these were statistically significant at the usual significance levels" (p. 72). Citing Cook's (1984a) statement that "little confidence should be placed in any of the mean results presented", Press commented, "I couldn't agree more. But this really means that we have learned very little from the meta analysis about whether school desegregation has affected the academic achievement of Black children."

[35] For some studies more than one ES was obtained when analysis was by grade level and scores in more than one grade were assessed.

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concerning the Zdep experiment were +.66 and -.15.

Both the Anderson and Zdep investigations, which so significantly tilted overall NIE findings, contained fundamental flaws. They involved voluntary and not forced busing, and fifth and sixth grade desegregated students in the Anderson study achieved less than their segregated counterparts (Weinberg, 1977). Moreover, of the 1500 students Anderson originally tested, participants were not randomly selected and data were drawn from only 150 students (75 pairs). Mean IQs of desegregated and segregated students were 97.9 and 98.6 respectively; these scores are substantially above national means for urban black. There were other problems in the Anderson investigation. All teachers in the desegregated schools were white. Moreover, Weinstein and Geisel (1963) reported that parents of participating desegregated black students were more socially involved and active in social issues than were parents of segregated students. As for Zdep's investigation, results were drawn from a second grade group readiness test administered in the fall and spring of the first year of desegregation and employed a small N (12) in the desegregated group; further, the report fails to state where the study was done.

Reporting Results

On December 17, 1982, the panelists gathered in Washington for an NIE sponsored public discussion of findings. Media reports (Mirga, 1983) indicated that plans for the panel were formulated following the election of President Reagan, partly because some "officials" were "upset" by findings of the seven year study headed by Hawley et.al. (1981, 1983) sponsored by the (pre-Reagan) NIE, and which had reported prepublication findings of segregatory benefits with respect to race relations and learning. (Mirga, 1983).[36] During the public forum, Hawley defended his studies and Manuel Justiz, newly designated NIE director, vowed continued priority of objective studies into sensitive educational issues.

Despite differences within the panel and ignoring raw data considerations, major news outlets discussed general agreement that desegregation enabled Blacks to make slight reading gains amounting to

[36] Hawley's investigation, cited in the 1981 USSC hearings, generated wide support for both busing and anti-Reagan sentiment. (Associated Press, 1981; Caldwell, 1981; Kihss, 1981).

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"somewhat less than a month to about two months" following one year's attendance at desegregated schools, with smaller math gains. In fact, panelists disagreed as to whether authentic reading gains were observed in the "core" studies, and doubted that any math gains occurred (Ascik, 1984; Ingram, 1990). Virtually no media reports identified one key finding: Armor (1984) and Stephen (1984) observed that not a single mandatory desegregation program yielded achievement benefits. Unmentioned was Scott's reply, as panel moderator, to several (pre-Reagan) government officials who expressed concern that panel results might restrict desegregatory initiatives. In reply to those officials, Scott averred that if mandated school busing is nonhelpful or even harmful, perhaps it should be discontinued. He further suggested the feasibility of implementing viable multicultural schooling reforms which, by emphasizing coordination of home and school as well as biological considerations, might provide genuine schooling benefits to poor and minority students.

Publication Plans Change

NIE administrators had set an April 1983 publication date for a monograph, co-edited by Cook and Scott, which summarized panel findings. However after the December forum Scott's calls and letters to NIE officials went unanswered. On February 19, 1983, Ascik telephoned Scott and urged an accelerated completion of the first and concluding monograph chapters. Scott replied that he had been unable to communicate with key NIE people and Ascik urged him to contact Uribe and Sharon Horn, a contract manager. Calls to these individuals went unanswered. Scott finally reached Uribe on September 18, 1983 who reported that he had been informed by "higher ups" that (1) Scott no longer is an NIE consultant and his fee for working with NIE "...no longer exists. It has been reprogrammed for the NIE Director's reserve." (2) he (Uribe) would be terminated by NIE on October 1, 1983 (3) PAVAC, a committee charged with determining publication policies, elected not to publish the monograph and will instead put it on microfiche in incomplete form, and (4) plans to frame panel findings into a forum helpful to the courts in framing viable desegregation remedies have been scrapped.

On September 28, 1983, Scott received an announcement, part of a

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nationwide mass mailing, informing educators that NIE has commenced a (new) set of papers which seeks to clarify the relationship between effective schools and desegregation (Lindsay, 1983). Separately, the NIE released a paper co-authored by Schneider and Uribe (1983) which was later briefly reviewed by Cordray (1990), and which summarized the NIE project. In 1984, the NIE (1984) released a 224-page monograph (Cook, 1984a), which summarized conclusions of seven panelists: Scott was unmentioned. Approximately a year later, Ascik (1984) authored a paper concerning the NIE investigation. In all these papers and reports, Scott was unmentioned.

Puzzled by evolvement of the NIE study, Scott contacted Schneider by telephone on October 23, 2001. Asked about the 1983 paper which Schneider reportedly had co-authored with Uribe, (Cordray, 1990) Schneider replied that he had never seen such a paper, that he left the NIE in December 1982, that Uribe is deceased, and the NIE no longer exists, having been incorporated into the Office of Research Evaluation and Innovation.[37]

Events Following the NIE Study

Following completion of the NIE investigation, designed to determine "once and for all" whether school desegregation enhanced African-American learning, a number of researchers reported that the NIE study had produced evidence of African-American academic gains attributable to school desegregation (Ascik, 1984; Hendrie, 1999; Mickelson, 2001; Migra, 1983; Schneider & Uribe, 1983; Wortman, 1984; Wortman & Bryant, 1985). Other academians declared that Black Americans derive significant learning gains from forced busing (Dawkins & Braddock, 1994; Haushek, 2001; Hawley & Smylie, 1988; Ipka, 1993; Mickelson, 2001; Sociology of Education Business Meeting:

[37] Verdugo, Uribe and Schnieder (1996) reported results of KEYS (Keys to Excellence in Your School), a multi-year project which examined the underlying organizational conditions of teaching and learning. Here they mention a forthcoming KEYS publication which argues that school desegregation efforts have failed to improve educational status of Black students, and that a more logical approach would be to focus on improving those neighborhood schools attended by Black students. The Keys report notes that Hawley was a member of the KEYS Advisory Board; Verdugo was senior policy analyst in the Human and Civil Rights at the NEA (National Education Association); Uribe was NEA program manager in the National Center for Innovation; Schneider served as senior policy analyst in the NEA National Center for Innovation. Schneider is currently a senior policy analyst for educational policy and practices.

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Race and Ethnicity, 2002; Wells & Crain, 1994; Wells, 2002; Willie, 1984; Yun, 2002).

Continuing Claims of Busing Benefits:
Anatomy of an Influential Article

Writing in the *American Educational Research Journal* (*AERJ*), Mickelson (2001) advances four central claims: (1) "there is unambiguous evidence that desegregation enhances students' long term outcomes such as educational and occupational attainment..." (2) "...Tracking (or segregation of students on the basis of ability) can undermine the potential gains of desegregation efforts by resegrgating students..." (3) "...The Coleman Report (1996) found that academic outcomes were better for Blacks who attended desegregated schools than for those who attended segregated schools..." (4) "...Thomas Cook in summarizing the meta analysis of the 19 best studies in the 1983-94 NIE inquiry, concluded that desegregation "increased reading levels..." After these claims, Mickelson puzzlingly declares that "...despite significant narrowing in the last quarter century, (that) the Black White achievement gap noted at the time of *Brown* continues..."[38]

After reading Mickelson's article, Scott wrote to the *AERJ's* editor, and asked about the feasibility of preparing a short response to Mickelson's claims. Subsequently, Scott submitted a paper which produced rather surprising anonymous "blind" reviews. The first of the four *AERJ* reviewers simply checked off the items, provided no commentary, and recommended rejection. Another reviewer cited the absence of citations from Gary Orfield's text *Must We Bus* (1978), a text which provides no valid evidence of busing related Black achievement gains. Reviewer #3 commented that the paper "...comes across as terribly one sided. It politicizes and even demonizes the left but fails to consider politics of the right..." The final reviewer concludes that the article reflects a "particular ax to grind."

Researchers within academia, and most particularly those interested in acquiring tenure and promotion, realize that the Scott's experiences

[38] Mickelson's sources cite three studies which affirm long term (academic) desegregatory effects: Armor, (1995); Broddick & McPortland, (1998); and Wells & Crain, (1994). However, microanalytic readings of those citations fail to yield evidence of longitudinal academic benefits linked to school desegregation.

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responding to Mickelson's article simply reflect prevailing bias in academia designed to jettison any research which deviates from political correctness.[39, 40] Scant wonder that research in major American universities is now marked by "positively breathtaking" evidence of political allegiance which supercedes objectivity in sensitive academic domains ("One Faculty Indivisible," 2002).

Quo Vadis, American Education?

Revisiting the history of school desegregation reveals the difficulty in formulating accurate perspectives concerning outcomes of interventions designed to facilitate student learning. Indeed there is every reason to believe that serious policymakers cannot rely on social science to ascertain what does and does not work in schools. [41] In evaluating current educational research, Mayer refers to an "assault on science" which mirrors an historical conflict of "right" and "wrong," a conflict the biologist might describe as limbic stem opposed to cerebral cortex processes.[42, 43, 44]

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[39] In December 1999 *Education Week* featured a series of articles on desegregation which "freed millions of Black children from an inferior education" (Hendrie, 1999). Included was a glowing tribute to Kenneth Clark as having "secured the role of social science" in collating expert opinion into Footnote Eleven of the *Brown* decision. Reference is also made to USCCR funded reports which "documented several encouraging, even promising findings" concerning desegregation or forced busing: this specific reference is to the very study (Hawley, et al, 1981, 1983) included in the 1981United States Senate Subcommittee testimony, which had fueled the 1982-83 NIE inquiry. Seeking to set the record straight, Scott submitted a letter to the editor which was initially accepted as an article to be featured in *Education Week* and for which Scott was to receive an honorarium for $200 (Personal Communication, M. S. Reeves Commentary Editor, July 15, 1999). Subsequently, and without further explanation, Reeves informed Scott that the article would not be published and the honorarium was reduced to $100 (Personal Communication, December 16, 1999).

[40] As school budgets tighten and academicians debate desegregatory effects, courts continue to issue inconsistent rulings in such school districts as Duvall County Florida, St. Lucie County Florida, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, South Bend, Indiana, Seattle, Washington, Cherry Hill Township, New Jersey, Chicago, Rock Hill, South Carolina, Fayette County, Kentucky, Yonkers, New York, Kansas City, Missouri, and Buffalo, New York.

[41] During the early stages of the desegregation-achievement controversy, University of London's Professor Philip Vernon (1969) expressed bewilderment over reluctance of American researchers to deal objectively with socially sensitive issues. More recently and representative of a broad cadre of increasingly skeptical researchers, Joseph Masling (2002, p. 7) remarked, "When American psychologists have data that conflict with their theories, they retain the theories and discard the data...not immediately apparent is the potential cost of such an attitude.

[42] Reexamination of the NIE investigation lends credibility to Green's (1971) early warning of academic bias. If social scientists are to authentically serve the public, there is ample reason to

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Mayer's central thesis is that contemporary social scientists are reluctant to objectively deal with topics which must be better comprehended if the nation's vulnerable children are to receive an education that prepares them to become productive and happy adults. Unfortunately, it continues to be personally and professionally dangerous for an academic researcher to venture into the choppy waters of race research and report unvarnished facts: "there be dragons." (Scott, 2002) Thus is created a climate which literally forces capable researchers to choose between running high risks by candidly examining sensitive but critically important issues or to accept and promulgate conventionality and, in the words of Banks, former president of the American Educational Research Association (AERA), to "commit to democratic ideas" which, operationally translated, means simply submit to purely environmentalist conventionality.

In a very real sense, it can be argued that minority children have paid a high price for the moralization of psychological issues. Consider the remarks of Reed Lyons (1997) before a panel of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). Lyons, who directs NICHD research, testified that "failure to learn to read adequately is much more likely among poor children, among non-white children, and among non-native speakers of English." Commenting on that testimony, Strauss (2001) observed that of 59 studies on reading funded by the NICHD at the time of Lyons' testimony, ".... None are on the role that race, ethnicity and socio-economic stratification play in denying children access to literacy..."[45, 46, 47] Given the central message of

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deny services to existing power structures which restrict research perspectives and thus retard the growth of authentic knowledge.

[43] Current literature reveals that inflammatory charges of "racism" and disregard for poor and minority children continues to inhibit research (Banks, 1998; Lopez, 2001; Oakes, 1985; Oakes & Wells, 1998). Scheurich (2002) Addressing this issue, Pollock, (2001) has described the difficulty educators encounter in candidly discussing racial issues.

[44] Ideological bias among contemporary academia, many of whom are far removed from classroom reality, may partially explain what Anderson and Herr (1999) have described as a widening theoretical gap between researchers and educational practitioners.

[45] Future research may validate Frum's (1999) conclusion that such fundamental institutions as schools, courts, and government not infrequently harm society. Consequently, says Frum, Americans suffer a sufficiently enormous loss of faith as to be revolutionary. Certain emerging megatrends will seemingly change education as we know it. Over 850,000 children are now home-schooled (*Waterloo Courier*, 2001) and often – despite resistance by the educational communities – public support for school vouchers steadily increases (McGurn, 2002a, 2002b).

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the NIE study and the Supreme Court Decision *Brown vs. Board of Education* (1954) that preceded it, facts remain obscured and distorted by political considerations. Despite evidence, (Mayeske and Beaton, 1975) that schools alone account for no more than 12% of all that students learn, myths persist that schools alone can close social class and ethnic achievement gaps. Nowhere is the desire for quality education stronger than in African-American communities. A 2003 poll by the nonprofit organization Public Agenda found the 82% of African-American parents favored efforts to promote quality education; only 8% wanted an educational focus on diversity and integration (Henninger, 2003). Nonetheless, the NAACP and other civil rights organizations ignore ecological and biological factors and promote reforms which focus on what schools alone can do. In early 2003 the Children's Defense Fund issued a "Call for Action," asserting that the persistent failure of schools to provide equality of opportunity for all students is having a devastating

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Further, the recent state takeover of Philadelphia schools – fiercely opposed by teachers, blue-collar workers, minority leaders, the school board, city council, and parents and community groups – may be a harbinger of what lies ahead unless social scientists reverse what Posner (2001) has deplored as public intellectuals' proclivity to approach political and social change "with impatience and unrealism." Posner's concerns about "intellectuals' proclivity" is mirrored in the 2002 decision of European and American doctors to update the 2500-year old Hippocratic Oath. Christopher Davidson, Secretary General of the European Education of Internal Medicine, noted that the new code urges doctors to maintain a level of professional competencies, to keep up with scientific advances and to avoid conflict of interest (Reaney, 2002).

[46] From the time of *Brown* to the present, educational reforms have been, and are, enthusiastically promoted by some scholars, who while urging large school innovations, acknowledge the absence of supportive empirical evidence. Since the early 1990's, educators have enthusiastically promoted inclusion; as with mandated busing, there is no evidence of demonstrable benefits accruing from inclusion. Indeed, there is evidence that most students, irrespective of race, prefer courses where they can succeed (Bandura, 1986; Coleman & Webber, 2002; Shepard, 2000, p. 11; Yonezawa, Wells & Serna, 2002).

[47] Given an historical context, responses of American researchers to sensitive issues are comprehensible. Toynbee (1972) and Kennedy (1987) illustrate the dynamics of the rise and fall of institutions. In her book, *The March of Folly* (1984), the late Barbara Tuchman describes the ultimate consequences when leaders of a movement or institutions stubbornly cling to erring policies. The current crisis within the Catholic Church illustrates Tuchman's central thesis: it was easier to transfer priests than to address a painful problem. Contemporary social scientists face a similar conflict: it is easier to deny the failure of simplistic reforms such as forced busing than to search for more profound reasons for the persisting racial achievement gap. Unfortunately, some of the nation's most influential scholars continue to moralize sensitive topics and thus dampen open discussion. Further, if academics fail to create internal reform and restore a greater measure of open-minded and responsible scholarship to academia, reform may come externally: from parents, disillusioned legislators, and the courts.

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The Great Sex Divide



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The Feminist Paradox: An Index of Cultural Evolution

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The twentieth century witnessed a sea-change in cultural evolution. Effective and available reproductive technology was aligned with the ideology of gender egalitarianism, but ideological and moral systems remain a variable. As a consequence of that variability, gender complementarity as a worldview is placed in direct competition with gender egalitarianism. The argument is presented that over generations gender complementarity has a clear and decisive advantage over gender egalitarianism. However, increased autonomy and freedoms for one cohort of women will be systematically followed by decreased autonomy and freedoms for subsequent cohorts of women. No current community has managed to solve the paradox, and such a putative solution is still over the temporal horizon.

Key Words: Cultural evolution, gender roles, tertiary education

That cultures change over time is a given. Rome of the 20th century is quite different from the Rome of Caesar. The inhabitants of Manhattan, New York, have undergone a series of transformations since 1620. Chaucer's England is clearly distinct from Elton John's England. Since 1492, cultural traditions in both North and South America have been profoundly altered. Contemporary mainland Australia and Tasmania are both distinct from their cultural heritages of 1000 years ago.

The agricultural revolution was a sea-change from the world-view of hunters and gatherers. The industrial revolution again altered the perspectives about what was considered a normative world. It is argued here that the innovations of reproductive technologies – aligned with the emergence of an ideology of gender egalitarianism – have also shifted the trajectory of cultural evolution.

Such changes could be considered random with no predictability at all in terms of the direction of changes. On the other side of the conceptual coin, such changes could be considered to reflect patterns that are both detectable and predictable. This article attempts to profile one

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of those changes that has arisen with the confluence of (i) innovations in reproductive technologies and (ii) the ideology of gender egalitarianism.

In the early development of Anthropology as a discipline, "cultural" evolution – across generations – was an important component to Anthropological debate and scholarship. The direction and speed and magnitude of cultural changes received a good deal of theoretical attention (e.g. Bachofen 1861, Carneiro 1973, Frazer 1958; Lowie 1920, Morgan 1963, Maine 1873, Steward 1955, Tylor 1851. See Harris 1971 for a review of the literature on macro-theories; cf. Goodenough 1999.) Impetuses of such changes have been conceptualized in the form of shifts in technology (White 1959, Childe 1951), economic structure (Harris 1979, 1998, Marx 1859; cf. Fischer 1996), communication efficacy and forms of media (McLuhan 1964, 1967, 1989). Recent contributions have focused more on modeling/simulations and non-human examples of "cultural" evolution (e.g. Nisbett 1990, Sereno 1991, and Takahasi 1998; cf. Agner 1999, Graber 1995, Pocklington and Best 1997). For theories and discussions on bio-cultural feedback loops across generations, see Barkow 1980, 1989; Durham 1979, 1982, 1991; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1988 and Lumsden and Wilson 1982, 1985; cf. Brown's 1991 presentation of human universals.

However, the earlier enthusiasms waned. Part of the lessened interest was the lack of falsifiability to the macro-theories which were theoretically elegant, but difficult to hone down to testable hypotheses. In addition, when predictions could occur, there were too many counter-indicative cultures (Popper's "Black Swans" [Popper 1959, 1962]) which tended to invalidate the original model.

This effort attempts to make a contribution to the domain of cultural evolution. The attempt includes (1) constructing a testable hypothesis, (2) testing the hypothesis across cultures, and (3) interpreting the results in the context of a culture's competitive trajectory and viability across generations.

This inquiry proffers that the variable – access to tertiary education by gender – is systematically aligned, in a non-trivial manner, with the trajectory – across generations – of any given culture.

Given the importance of mating and reproductive strategies – writ small for families and writ large for the commonweal – the initial ques-

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tion to be asked and addressed becomes: "Is enhanced access for women to tertiary educational institutions (educational institutions beyond "high school") related to reproductive histories?"

Method

The United Nations surveyed enrollment figures in tertiary educational institutions by gender (Unesco 1999). Data were also available, across countries, on the rate of natural increase (Central Intelligence Agency 2002). "Natural increase" is determined by subtracting "death rates" (number of deaths per 1000 population) from "birth rates" (number of births per 1000 population) for any given year. If the resulting number is positive, then the population is growing, if immigration and/or emigration is not considered. If the number is negative, then the population is shrinking. If the number is zero, then the population is in stasis. One hundred and sixty-four countries had data for both indices: (1) percentage of students, by gender, in tertiary institutions and (2) rate of natural increase.

It should be noted that "nation," although a coarse filter, will be the unit of analysis. We will use this as the unit even though the more coarse-grained the filter, the higher the probabilities of false negatives. However, if a pattern is found within this coarse-grained filter despite all the noise in the system, the found signal is probably of some potency. And, as visited below, patterns – signals – were found.

Results

Across 164 nations, the mean percentage of females – rather than males – in tertiary education was 41% (sd = 16). Across 168 nations, the mean percentage of natural increase was 1.4% (sd = 1.1%). The relationship between the two variables, wherein both variables were represented, was negative and significant ($\underline{r}_p = -.514$; $\underline{p} < .001$, $n = 164$)[2]

[2] A problem this type of analysis faces is that of the relationship between aggregate data and individual data. Framed differently, aggregate data are not equipped to isolate behaviors of an individual, and, thus, inferences from an aggregate, an ecological unit, are generally inappropriate when directed at any individual (see Robinson [1950] for an early discussion of the problem, and see Borgatta & Jackson [1980], Goodman [1959], Hanushek, Jackson & Kain [1974], King [1997], Langbein & Lichtman [1978], Pedhazur [1982] for subsequent discussions plus partial solutions to the problem of relating aggregate data to individual behavior). Suffice it to say that the analysis below is not construed to specify how any one individual would or would

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That is, as the proportion of students that were women (compared to men) who were enrolled in tertiary education became higher, the rate of natural increase became lower. Approximately 25% ($-.514^2 = .264 = 26.4\%$) of the variance in the rate of natural increase could be attributed to changes in the proportion of women as students. Thus, the inverse relationship seems not only more real than merely apparent, but, given the potential for noise in the system, it is also fairly robust.

If the total fertility rate (TFR), total number of children born per woman, is used instead of the rate of natural increase, the relationship is also significant ($\underline{r}_p = -.663$; $n = 164$). Over 40 percent ($-.663^2 = .440 = 44.0\%$) of the variance in the TFR is attributable to changes in the percent of women (rather than men) enrolled in institutions of tertiary education. Note that the TFR and the percent of natural increase were significantly correlated ($\underline{r}_p = .823$, $p < .001$; $n = 168$).

Of course, anyone familiar with the field would not be surprised at the outcome. A discussion about the "demographic transition" is a mainstay in courses in the social sciences. The relationship between female fertility and education levels has been a cottage industry for decades with the same results and conclusions being reached. See Hirschman 1994; Hirschman, Tan, Chamrathrthirong and Guest 1994; Mason 1997; Robinson and Harbison 1995; Van De Kaa 1996; *inter alia*. Accordingly, this statistic is not presented as being new or innovative. What we are now adding are the consequences of such a statistic, not merely for the individuals involved at that time, but for the impact such patterns have upon cultural evolution. Such a putative impact has not been as extensively analyzed.

Of course, these two variables do not operate in a vacuum. Neither the composition of tertiary institutions nor fertility levels exist in isolation. As Figure 1 illustrates, there are a myriad of relationships aligned with the rate of natural increase. The model presented here suggests that as the *per capita* income within a cash economy increases, (i) the agriculture work force is lessened, (ii) the involvement of women in higher education and politics increases, and (iii) the percent of natural

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not behave. The analysis below is content to attempt to discover what – if any – behavior patterns are aligned with other behavior patterns.

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increase is lowered. Figure 1 suggests a model of how the variables meld together. To wit: when the collective impact upon natural increase by (i) the percentage of females in tertiary educational institutions, (ii) the percentage of females in their national parliaments, (iii) the percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture, and (iv) gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita* income are examined as an aggregate, the result is also significant ($R = .644$; $p < .001$; $n = 151$). These four (independent) variables account for over a third (adj. $R^2 = .399 = 39.9\%$) of the variance in the level of natural increase.[3] See Figure 1. Thus, it is argued that when women are able to (i) have a career and (ii) participate in political power structures, and (iii – iv) move from subsistence agriculture to a job for salaries/wages, then birth rates and rates of natural increase are systematically lowered.

Discussion

There are three sub-samples within the larger sample that seemed particularly interesting: Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and a Moslem swathe reaching eastward from Mauritania, crossing over northern Africa, through the Middle East to Pakistan.

Europe vis-a-vis Sub-Saharan Africa

When Europe ($n = 37$ countries) and Sub-Saharan Africa ($n = 32$ countries) are isolated and then examined in tandem, two rather separate groups emerge. The mean percentage of women in tertiary education in Sub-Saharan Africa was 24.0% (sd = 14.3%). This number was less than half the European figure (50.0%; sd = 5.5%). The two geographical areas had cleanly pulled apart from each other ($t = 106.3$; $df = 67$; $p < .001$). The rate of natural increase in the Sub-Saharan African sample (2.1%; sd = 0.9%) was more than 20 times (21.0) the rate of natural increase for Europe (0.1%; sd = 0.5%). Again, these two geographical areas had clearly separated from each other ($t = 124.2$; $df = 67$; $p < .001$).

When Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa are combined to form a sub-

[3] Note that if the total fertility rate (TFR), the number of live births a woman is expected to have over a lifetime, replaces the rate of natural increase, the (patterned) results remain the same. If percentage of females (rather than males) in institutions of secondary education replaces institutions of tertiary education, these (patterned) results remain the same. Data are available from the second author.

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sample of 69, the resultant correlation between the rate of natural increase and percentage of women in tertiary education is significant (r_p = – .645; $p < .001$; df = 67). This relationship is also inverse. As the percentage of women in tertiary institutions rose, the rate of natural increase fell. A hefty 41% ($-.645^2 = .416 = 41.6\%$) of the variance in rates of natural increase can be attributed to changes in the level of female participation in tertiary education.

The Moslem Swathe.

For the 25 nations in the Moslem swathe, as defined here, the correlation between rate of natural increase and percentage of women in tertiary education was *not* significant (r_p, n.s.). Knowledge of the percentage of women in institutions of higher learning had no predictive ability in divining the rate of natural increase. What was of additional interest was the average rate of natural increase for the sub-sample: 2.4% (sd = 0.8%). This figure of 2.4% was higher than the rest of the sample (n = 139) at 1.2% (sd = 1.0%) ($t = 29.6$, $p < .001$; df = 161).

Thus, this group of Moslem nations was not following the more general trend of an inverse relationship between women's fertility and educational options. This lack of consonance will be addressed in a subsequent section.

Women's Roles and Fertility.

For the entire sample (n = 164 countries) and both the European and the Sub-Saharan African sub-samples (n = 69), it is clear that, as women's participation in tertiary education increased, there was a concomitant decline in the rate natural increase. The questions to be addressed are (i) Why would there be any relationship at all between education and fertility? and (ii) Why did the Moslem swathe not follow the larger trend?

It is argued here that, across generations, any roles that conflict with the role of motherhood tend to be precluded systematically from women. Furthermore, this preclusion is self-generating. Said a little differently, Brown's (1970) thesis, primarily based on a sample of agrar

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

* $p < .001$; (n's range from 155 to 168)

$R = .644$; $p < .001$; $n = 151$

adj. $R^2 = .399$ or 39.9%

Figure 1. Demographic parameters of natural increase

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ian, peasant societies, was that if a job or task interfered with mothering, that task was given to men. If a task needed concentrated attention, over time, men would be given that task; e.g., metallurgy, hunting large mammals, plowing. If a task could be stopped or started at will, with no loss of the quality of the product, that task was often given to women; e.g., grinding, water gathering. (See White, Burton and Dow [1981] and White, Brudner and Burton [1977] for refinement of the Brown thesis). Cross-cultural surveys have clearly noted that primary child-caretaking, especially of infants, is a female task (Barry & Paxson 1971, Hewlett 1992, Mackey 1985, 1996, Murdock & Provost 1973, Weisner & Gallimore 1977). Usually the mother will rear the child, but, if not the mother, then female siblings or aunts or grandmothers fulfill the child caretaking role.

While it is arguable that the role of student is in conflict with the role of mother, tertiary education would be finished by the woman in her low or middle twenties. Approximately two decades of fecundity would be available to the educated woman for her to have an extended reproductive history. Such a cultural tactic seems to be the one exercised by some countries in the Moslem Swathe. That is, high levels of education, as well as low levels, were also associated with high levels of fertility

On the other hand, if a completed tertiary degree is envisioned by the women as a means to a career, then a very different set of expectations applies. A (woman's) career can last across her reproductive years. A career certainly can be in conflict with the expectations of the status role-complex of mother. If the conflict does occur or is strongly portended for the future, the woman has choices to make.

(1) She can maximize her career trajectory by remaining childless, or

(2) she can jettison her career totally by adopting the mother-role and, thereby, experience no conflicts that would stem from occupational demands, or

(3) she can strike a balance of sorts. She can bear a restricted number of children and also pursue her career. The demands of child-rearing, with few children, would not be zero, but would be of limited duration. Such a tactic certainly seems to be the route taken by many European women. The average number of children per female is consistently

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below two, and the entry of women into the paid labor force is quite substantial. See Table 1 for examples of the relationship between education beyond primary/ secondary levels and fertility for six countries.

The Moslem Swathe

The Moslem Swathe data indicated no relationship between the education index and the level of natural increase. Plus, the rate of natural increase was comparatively high. However, there was a strong relationship, within this sub-sample, between the level of income in the country (measured by per *capita* income based on the gross domestic product (Central Intelligence Agency 2002) and the proportion of women in tertiary education ($r_p = .829$, $n = 25$, $p < .001$). The relationship was positive: the more the income, the higher the proportion of women in tertiary education. However, the richer Moslem countries (invariably from oil wealth) that had a higher percentage of women students in tertiary education also had high levels of natural increase. This anomaly seems contradictory to the general trend examined in this paper: women's enhanced education lowers those women's fertility.

The contradiction may be more apparent than real. Authors, including feminist ideologues, who have written ethnographic accounts of the relevant Moslem countries invariably refer to the strongly patriarchal character of the political and economic structures. The question is never "*Is* the country patriarchic?" The theses revolve around how the patriarchy developed and how is it maintained. For example, Ahmed (1992) writes: "The subordination of women in the ancient Middle East appears to have become institutionalized with the rise of urban societies and with the rise of the archaic state in particular..." and, as Islam crystallized its theology, "Implicit in this new order was the male right to control women and to interdict their interactions with other men. Thus the ground was prepared for the closures that would follow." See Kadioglu (1994) for a parallel argument for women's role in Turkey. Toubia (1988, pp. 2-3) makes the case quite clearly: "Arab women are dominated by men in every area of life in the patriarchal family system: state, political party, trade union and public and private institutions of all types." She noted that over 97% (97.2%) of the Yemeni women, as late

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TABLE 1

Number of births and number of expected births for women across six countries (Bianchi & Spain 1986, Smock 1981, U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995)

Country	*Completed Education*	*Completed fertility*	*Births to date*	*% Expecting no further births*
U.S.A.[a]	Less than high school degree	-	1.7	8.7%
(1982)	High school: 4 years	-	1.2	10.3%
	College: 1 to 3 years	-	0.8	13.1%
	College: 4 years	-	0.6	15.7%
	College: 5 years or more	-	0.6	18.7%
U.S.A.[a]	Less than high school degree	-	1.8	7.6%
(1992)	High school: 4 years	-	1.3	9.0%
	College: 1 to 3 years	-	0.8	10.0%
	College: 4 years	-	0.7	10.3%
	College: 5 years or more	-	0.6	12.0%
Mexico[b]	None	7.8		
	1-3 years	7.5		
	4-6 years	6.3		
	Secondary+	1.6		
Ghana[b]	None	6.6		
	Primary	5.7		
	Middle	5.4		
	Secondary	4.4		
	University	1.4		
Kenya[b]	None	7.4		
	1-4 years	7.9		
	5-7 years	8.7		
	8-11 years	5.3		
	12-13 years	2.5		
Pakistan[b]	None	5.9		
	1-10	6.1		
	10+	6.8		
	Special education	3.2		
Philippines[b]	None	5.6		
	1-4 years	6.5		
	5-7 years	6.4		
	8-12 years	5.9		
	University	4.5		

[a] For women 18 – 34 years of age; [b] For women who are at least 35 years of age

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as 1975, were illiterate. Badran (1995, p. 5) notes that "the woman was perceived as essentially or exclusively, a sexual being, unlike the man who was only partly understood in terms of his sexuality". Gerami (1996, p. 157.) views the current version of Islamic fundamentalism as "...nipping a very young feminist movement in the bud and under the banner of nature's mandate, pushed women further into the family. They managed to cast woman's individualistic identity as a perversion of her nature plotted by Western imperialists". Obermeyer (1995, p. 370) observes that the "Islamic emphasis on complementarity rather than equality in gender roles" makes dialogue with a worldview predicated on equality rather than complementarity extremely difficult. Inhorn (1996) writes that: "In a society (Egypt) where the patriarchal fertility mandate is emphatic, the social and psychological consequences of 'missing motherhood' – of being a woman unable to deliver a child for her husband, family, affines, community, faith, nation, and not inconsequentially her – are nothing if not profound". It is germane to this argument that, in general, Moslem men can initiate divorce far more easily than the Moslem women. The Koran gives some theological basis for this asymmetry, and local interpretations have intensified the gender differences (Ansari 1973, Caner and Caner 2002, Hekmat 1997, Kamali 1984), (cf. Barlas [2002] who specifically argues that the interpretations of the Koran, rather than the Koran itself, result in high levels of patriarchy). For reviews of the literature, see Al-Qazzaz (1977), Meghdessian (1980), Mernisse (1991), Raccagni (1978), and Tucker (1993). For theoretical overviews, see Caner and Caner (2002), Lerner (1986), Orens (2003), and Walby (1990).

A survey of women in legislatures found that women in the 18 Moslem nations, which were included in the survey, averaged 4% (4.0%, s.d. = 3.9%) of the legislators. This figure is contrasted to the average of women legislators of 17.7% (sd. = 10.6%) in the European nations [$t = 28.0$; $p < .001$; $df = 52$] (United Nations 2001). Thus, even though Moslem women in some countries were afforded relatively easy access to higher education, their subsequent entry into professions and occupations and power structures wherein they could use their knowledge seems as equally as restrictive as if they did not have the advanced degree.

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A Suggested Causal Relationship.

Correlation coefficients (such as $\underline{r}_p$), of course, cannot demonstrate causality. And there are three basal interpretations available to the significant correlations presented here: (1) changes in rates of natural increase are driving women's educational achievements, or (2) changes in educational levels are driving rates of natural increase, or (3) a third variable is driving both of the other two variables: natural rate of increase and educational levels. The likelihood of each of the three is examined below.

The first option – changes in natural increase are driving educational achievements – seems, at face value, implausible. Functional sterility would not be a reasonable explanation why women would increase their pursuit of higher levels of education. The second – changes in education levels are driving rates of natural increase – has a ring of common sense to it. However, as mentioned earlier, students generally achieve a terminal degree in tertiary institutions by their low or middle twenties. Nearly two decades of fecundity are still available to such women.

Accordingly, a third variable – occupational and income mobility – is suggested to be the operant variable. Higher education is certainty a conduit to enhanced occupation and income mobility. And, indeed, other surveys have documented that when women do have an opportunity to enter into a cash occupation, they do just that. For examples and discussion, see Caldwell (1982), Easterlin and Crimmins (1985), Handwerker (1986), Fawcett (1983), Day and Mackey 1986), cf. Aghajanian (1979, 1988), Bradley (1984), Nag, White and Peet (1978), and Ross and Harris (1987).

Thus, it is suggested that the drive-wheel for the inverse relationship between rates of natural increase and the levels of women to be involved in the educational process is the expectations by the women for a higher income via a skilled profession. The apparent anomaly from the Moslem swathe data can, thereby, be explained by the lack of translation of educational attainment into occupational opportunities in a patriarchic society.

In the world-wide survey, a similar predictability was found in the (negative) relationship between the level of natural increase and the percentage of females – rather than males – in national parliaments

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(United Nations 2001) ($r_p = -.381$; $p < .001$; $df = 153$). In other words, as the opportunity for a career in political leadership becomes more available to women, the rate of natural increase falls (below replacement value in many cases (see Lesthaeghe and Willems [1999] for relatively current examples from Europe). Also note that the percentage of females in tertiary education was significantly related to the percentage of females in national parliaments ($r_p = .276$; $p < .001$; $n = 151$).[4] Thus, the notion that both variables are markers for enhanced career, not just educational, opportunities is given support.

The U.S. as a Test-tube

Under the rubric of the notion that occasionally a reminder will trump inspiration, it is useful to note that it is a mother who gives birth to a child. No child exists without being birthed by a woman. A woman can exist without bearing a child, but no child can exist without being borne by a woman. In the middle of the 20th century, improved reproductive technologies to optimize women's ability to efficiently regulate their own fertility became fairly widespread, if not universal. Thus, a woman, if she foregoes chastity, could decide to be a mother or not. A mother could decide to have one child or more than one child. The technology that would help allow her to exercise that option became widely available and relatively inexpensive. The value systems or moral codes that allowed, if not encouraged, the utilization of that technology also emerged in various areas of the world, but were concentrated initially in highly industrialized nations such as Japan or those in Western Europe and its extensions (e.g., Canada, Australia, the U.S.). Thus, in the mid-20th century, efficient and affordable technology became (theoretically) available to everyone; i.e., a constant. The moral or value systems that would embrace or reject such technologies became a variable.

Test-tube U.S.A.

The United States, with its polyglot admixture of cultures and subcultures and communities, thereby becomes an interesting test-tube to examine cultural evolution. That is, within the context of available

[4] When acting in tandem, the two independent variables' ([i] percent of tertiary students who are female and [ii] the percent of females in national parliaments) impact upon the dependent variable (rate of natural increase) is significant ($R = .624$; $p < .001$; $n = 151$).

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means to tamp down the number of births, the question becomes: Would all of the U.S. communities equally avail themselves of those means and reduce their birth rates (and thus rates of natural increase)? In addition, if differences in demographic changes were to be found, then would there be any meaningful theory that could synthesize or cohere the disparate data and be instrumental in generating useful predictions?

Three Time Frames

Three time frames were selected for examination: (i) the mid-1920s, (ii) the mid-1960s, and (iii) the mid-1990s. See Table 2. Two other times are also presented, but only for context – the mid-1940s and the mid-1980s. Data from these two time frames will not be further analyzed.

A pair of changes in the level of population will be examined across two time intervals. First, changes from the 1920s (after which European immigration was much attenuated) to the 1960s and from the 1960s to the 1990s. By the 1960s, the mainstream U.S. culture experienced a number of trends: (i) the post-war "baby boom" had ended and the centuries-long decline in reduced birth rates resumed, (ii) the contraceptive "pill," *inter alia*, had become readily available, (iii) a newly energized "women's movement" had gained momentum, and (iv) the notion of individual rights and entitlements had gained momentum. It should be noted that, in 1972, U.S. women, as a collective, dropped below replacement value of 2100 children per 1,000 women and have stayed below that figure until 2000 (Center for Disease Control 2002, p. 1).

Different communities could embrace these changes to a greater or lesser degree. The argument here is that the more embracing that occurs, the lower the rate of natural increase, and the less embracing that occurs, the higher the rate of natural increase. Second, the population-changes from the 1960s to the 1990s could then be analyzed to see if differential incorporation, by the various communities, would be reflected in level of natural increase.

Selection of Communities

Given that moral/value systems are inherent in religious groups, different religious denominations were surveyed – across generations – to see if rates of natural increase were also different. Those religious

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groups were selected that were not known for a heavy emphasis on recruiting converts within the U.S., and, thus, changes in church membership were probably more dependent upon rates of natural increase than upon converts. Episcopalians, Lutherans, Unitarian-Universalists,[5] Non-Hasidic Jews, and the Reorganized Church of the Latter Day Saints (currently The Community of Christ) were selected as religious denominations that more reflected the ascendancy of the individual – irrespective of gender.

The Mennonites – which included the Old Order Amish and the Hutterite Brethren – and the Latter Day Saints (the Mormons) were selected as examples of denominations that are more focused on the group, and less influenced by the thrust of enhancing individualized self-fulfillment and that more emphasize gender complementarity than gender egalitarianism. The Shakers are also noted, and their inclusion will be discussed in a later section. See Table 2. See Appendix I for citations that provided guidance on the selections.[6]

Results

Changes from the 1920s to the 1960s

All of the groups – even in the context of relatively high rates of infant mortality – increased their populations substantially. The lowest increase was for the Jews, but, even then, their population grew by more than a third. See Table 2.

The 1960s to the 1990s

However, from the 1960s to the 1990s, two separate trajectories became clear. One trajectory illustrated near stasis. The Episcopalians, the Unitarians-Universalists, the Jews, the Reorganized Church of the Latter Day Saints, and the Lutherans all illustrate relatively minor fluctuations in population growth. Two groups, the Episcopalians and the Unitarian-Universalists experienced drops in their populations. The Lutherans had the greatest increase of this cohort of just over a quarter.

All of the other groups – Mennonites, Old Order Amish, the Hutterite Brethren, and the Latter Day Saints – more than doubled their populations. See Table 3 for a more detailed profile of the Amish

[5] The Unitarians and the Universalists merged in 1961.

[6] A more detailed analysis of selection criteria is available from the first author.

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TABLE 2

Growth of selected religious groups from the 1920s to the 1960s and from the 1960s to the 1990s

(Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches, 1925-2001).

GROUP	YEAR:						
	Mid 20s (000)	*Mid 40's (000)*	*Mid 60s (000)*	*Mid 80's (000)*	*Mid 90's (000)*	*60s/20s*	*90s/60s*
Episcopalians	1,164.9	2,155.5	3,410.7	2,775.4	2,317.8	**292.8%**	**68.0%**
Reorg LDS	89.5	116.9	168.4	192.4	137.1	**188.2%**	**81.4%**
Judaism[7]	4,081.2	4,641.0	5,600.0	5,817.0	6,061.0	**137.2%**	**108.2%**
Presbyterians	1,828.9	1,986.3	3,279.2	3,122.2	3,561.2	**179.3%**	**108.6%**
Mennonites	36.6	51.8	77.3	110.3	92.0	**211.2%**	**119.0%**
Lutherans	2,546.1	4,731.9	6,507.2	7,932.8	8,270.8	**255.6%**	**127.1%**
Unitarian-Universalists	117.7	112.3	164.5	169.2	216.9	**139.8%**	**131.9%**
Southern Baptists	3,611.6	5,367.1	10,393.0	14,178.1	15,851.8	**287.8%**	**152.5%**
Latter Day Saints	535.7	911.3	1,789.2	3,601.0	5,113.4	**334.0%**	**285.8%**
Old Order Amish	7.6	13.4	20.4	34.0	80.8	**268.4%**	**396.1%**
Hutterites	0.7[8]	0.3	7.6	4.0[9]	42.8	**1085.7%**	**563.2%**
Shakers	0.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
					Mean	**307.3%**	**194.7%**
					(sd)	**266.1%**	**156.4%**

[7] Importantly, these numbers do not include the ultra-orthodox Hasidim.
[8] These 700 are reported to have moved to Canada.
[9] An additional 27,200 are reported to have lived in Canada.

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increase.

At this point, a minor digression is called for. The clearest difference between any two groups/tribes/communities/religions seems to be between the Hutterites and the Shakers. In the mid-1920s, there were approximately 300 Shakers and approximately 700 Hutterites in the U.S. Neither group had as many as 1,000 members. The Shakers had a philosophy that included chastity, which, by definition, would preclude children. Thus, any Shaker growth would be due to recruitment from other groups that did not practice celibacy or chastity. By the 1960s, the Shaker culture was gone. The Shakers had become an historical footnote. By the mid-1960s, the Hutterites – traveling back and forth between the northern Midwest and Canada – had approximately 7,600 members in the U.S. By the mid-1990s, there were 41,600 Hutterites in the U.S., or an increase of over 500% since the mid-1960s. In 1880, there were 443 Hutterites in Canada. By 1972, there were 21,521 Hutterites in Canada or a 48-fold increase. How much the census data are influenced by the Canadian-U.S. shuttle is unknown, but under any circumstance and by any measure of analysis, the growth of the Hutterite Brethren is impressive. Although the birth rate among the Hutterite Brethren has decreased within the last few decades, the crude birth rate in 1990 of 35.2 was more than twice the national average in the U.S. (Kraybill and Bowman 2001). In terms of cultural evolution, high fertility would seem to have an enormous advantage – across generations – when compared to sterility. As self-evident as this notion seems to be, its dynamics invariably fails to be acknowledged in discourses within the behavioral sciences.

Caveat

It should be emphasized and re-emphasized that the numbers in Table 2 are not amenable to a microscopic one-to-one analysis or correspondence per denomination. The lack of amenability stems from a number of sources. First, the figures are not census numbers surveyed by the Department of Commerce. In general, various officials of the various religions were simply asked: "How many people are in your denomination?" Some officials seem to have specific figures for the relevant year at their finger-tips. Some officials were more "in the (large)

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TABLE 3

AMISH POPULATION GROWTH,

NORTH AMERICA (1900 – 1992) (KRAYBILL 1994)

YEAR	ESTIMATED POPULATION	PERCENT GROWTH FROM PREVIOUS DECADE
1900	4,800	–
1910	6,550	136.5%
1920	12,450	190.1%
1930	16,500	132.5%
1940	23,100	140.0%
1950	30,300	131.2%
1960	40,350	133.2%
1970	55,050	136.4%
1980	85,350	155.0%
1990	134,700	157.8%

ballpark" for a recent, but not current year. Some denominations ignored the question, and their numbers are simply unknown. Fissions and fusions, especially in the Protestant churches, may have over-counted or under-counted some denominations across the decades. Our theological leaders may possess great skills in faith and in shepherding their flocks, but demographic precision is not an arrow in their quivers. Nonetheless, without drawing too fine a point, the data in Table 2 probably represent a valid, but not fine-grained, filter.

The question then becomes: "Is there a coherent theory that could explain at least part of the divergence in population growth between the two different trajectories?" Such a coherence is attempted below.

A Theory from J. K. Brown

As mentioned earlier, J. K. Brown (1970) wrote a short, simple, and elegant note in the *American Anthropologist*: "A note on the division of labor." In essence, the note reflected Brown's analysis of the division of labor by gender across the world's community of societies. In her abstract, she wrote: "Women are most likely to make a substantial contribution when subsistence activities have the following characteristics: the participant is not obliged to be far from home; the tasks are relatively monotonous and do not require rapt concentration; and the work is not

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dangerous, can be performed in spite of interruptions, and is easily resumed once interrupted" (pp. 1073-1074). It is argued here that Brown's theory is as valid in industrialized societies of the 21st century as in peasant and agrarian societies in the 20th century. See Murdock (1949) and Murdock and Provost (1973) for examples of gender-specific tasks that support Brown's thesis.

A Synthesis

There are four universals that are germane to this argument which, when taken together with the preceding data, would suggest the following. The current relationship between individual choice per woman and the viability of the community – across generations – in which the women reside is not unrelated. As individual autonomy per woman increases, the viability of her community – across generations – is threatened.

The four universals include:

> Universal #1: Each individual who is alive at Time 1 will be dead at some point Time 2. Said less prosaically, everyone is mortal.
>
> Universal #2: While everyone currently alive is guaranteed to have had ancestors, no one is guaranteed to have descendants.
>
> Universal #3: Inhabitable lands do not remain empty. Farmlands of deceased celibate farmers do not stay fallow for long. Cottages of dead, childless couples do not remain empty for long.
>
> Universal #4: Humans are intensely bio-cultural beings. Wherever a human decides to move, he or she carries along a biological heritage and a socialization heritage.

The four universals, currently, seem fairly immutable. Each one will be briefly examined.

Universal #1: Everyone is mortal

This item is, hopefully, intuitively obvious, if somewhat unpleasing to contemplate, and needs no further elaboration.

Universal #2: Everyone has ancestors,
But not everyone will have descendants

By being born, any given person is guaranteed to have had ancestors

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who (a) were attractive enough to the other gender to result in sexual intimacy, (b) were fertile, and (c) were willing to spend sufficient amounts of finite time and energy to rear the next generation to independence. Given the altricial nature of humans, the time and energy is measured in years or decades rather than mere moments. However, if an individual is born and does survive to maturity, that individual is not similarly guaranteed (a) attractiveness, (b) fertility, and (c) self-sacrifice. That is, merely because a person has had parents and grandparents, that person is not necessitated to have children and grandchildren. There is no imperative of symmetry between past and future generations. Although individuals have no choice on whether to be born or not, people can choose to mate or not. People can choose to bring children to term or not. People can choose to invest – lightly, moderately, or heavily – in their children or not.

Universal #3: Good land does not remain barren of people

If governments, climate, and accessibility are not prohibitive, people will move into lands that are otherwise unoccupied by other people. The more prime the land, the more numerous and more exuberant are the individuals who would settle the opened territory. Migrants crossed the Bering Strait thousands of years ago to occupy North and South America. Europeans crossed the Atlantic Ocean hundreds of years ago to settle (what to them were) unoccupied continents. As soon as watercraft were sufficiently improved, the islands of the Pacific were populated by sailors and their descendants. With the exception of Antarctica, people have squeezed into virtually any ecological nook and cranny that could sustain life.

When the last Shaker died, New England did not become depopulated. When the last aboriginal Tasmanian died, Tasmania was not without a citizenry. Whatever the fate of the Mbuti pygmies, the Capoids, the San, or the Yanomamo, their homelands will not be without homesteaders. Reverting back to Universal #2, across generations, all homelands will be peopled by groups who had both ancestors and descendants.

Universal #4: Humans are bio-cultural beings

Whatever the mix of genes – nature – and socialization traditions –

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nurture – , every human is a product of both forces. For any given behavior, there are those who may argue, with both heat and light, on the dominance of nature over nurture or the reverse. The argument here is simply that both forces are extant, and extant to some degree, at least, for virtually any important behavior or trait imaginable. Every adult reflects both (i) the genetic package that allowed his or her ancestors to survive and propagate, plus (ii) the socialization traditions that successfully reared that adult to maturity. To the extent organization inhibits reorganization, childhood inculcations will bias adult psycho-social behaviors; i.e., as the sapling is bent, so grows the tree.

With these four items as a background, the foreground is discussed below.

Unfettered extrapolation of demographics has been, is, and will be a bane of the behavioral sciences. Nonetheless, a patterned trend does present itself. Women's equal access to an education that would translate into career opportunities seems to be at loggerheads with population maintenance. When multiple options of life-style are available to women, they take them. Thus, when competition to the mother-role is extant, the mother-role is, by definition, constricted. Fertility decreases.

Two models present themselves to help give context to this pattern. One is a cyclical model, and the second is a replacement model.

Cyclical model

It is a logical category that there is some type of demographic thermostat that triggers greater fertility if replacement values are not met by a society's women. However, no such thermostat has been presented in the literature. In addition, no demographic data have been presented that would suggest that such a thermostat, in fact, exists. There is no evidence of cyclicity.

Replacement model

It is also a logical category that (sub)groups of women with greater numbers of children would replace (sub)groups of women with fewer numbers of children. That is, lands would not remain empty if children-grown-to-adulthood fail to be conceived or to be raised. If a barren lineage disappears, its geographical space would be filled by a more fertile lineage. This explanatory category seems promising. The ethnographic

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literature is replete with examples of "tribes" or "groups" that have gone extinct. Caesar's Rome, the Tasmanians, scores of North and South American Indian tribes, and the Shakers are all gone. However, Rome is not depopulated. Tasmania is peopled. North and South America have millions of citizens. New England is teeming with New Englanders.

The European versus Moslem swathe samples again prove illustrative. The European sample with fertility levels below replacement value and an ideology biased toward gender egalitarianism is geographically situated next to a Moslem sample with fertility levels well above replacement value and an ideology biased toward gender complementarity, wherein the woman is constricted toward the mother role. In terms of cultural evolution, the inertia would seem to be with the Moslem swathe's bio-cultural formula – with the emphasis on "-cultural" – and its displacement by that of the Europeans. Below is empirical support for the reality of such a displacement.

In an example of cultural diffusion, emigrants from the Moslem swathe tend to flow from high fertility, lower income areas to low fertility, higher income areas; i.e., to Western Europe. In the context of this article, emigrants from the Moslem swathe would be expected to gravitate toward (Western) European nations. When they enter and settle into their new homeland, they bring with them the world-views, expectations, and traditions that had successfully lead to their own socialization. This cultural package includes an anticipation of relatively high fertility. For example, Turkish immigrants into Austria average 4.43 children per woman. This figure is more than twice the figure for Austrian nationals (1.64 children per woman). Moroccan immigrants into Belgium average 5.7 children, and Turkish women average 5.0 children. Both of these averages are more than three times the mean number of children per Belgian nationals (1.6). Pakistan immigrants into Great Britain average 5.3 children per woman. This figure is more than triple the figure for Great Britain's average of 1.7. French nationals average 1.82 children per woman, which is less than half of immigrants from Algeria (4.24), Morocco (4.47), Tunisia (4.67), and Turkey (4.55). German women average about 1.3 children each, whereas Turkish immigrants average more than twice that number (2.9 children). Dutch women average 1.6 children, but Turkish women who immigrate into the

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Netherlands average 3.1 children and Moroccan immigrants average 4.7 children. Finally, Swedish women average 2.1 children, but Turkish immigrants average 3.45 children (Coleman 1994). See White (1997) and see Morris (1997) for discussion. Thus, each of the two demographic

TABLE 4.

Highest (top 10) and lowest (bottom 10) fertility rates (mean number of children per woman) by country and geographical area

(Central Intelligence Agency 2000).

Highest Ranked:				Lowest Ranked:			
Rank	Area	Country	No. of children	Rank	Area	Country	No. of children
1	Africa	Somalia	7.18	1	Europe	Latvia	1.13
2	Africa	Niger	7.16		Europe	Bulgaria	1.13
3	Africa	Ethiopia	7.07	3	Europe	Spain	1.15
4	Asia	Yemen	7.05	4	Asia	Singap.	1.16
5	Africa	Uganda	6.96	5	Europe	Czech Rep.	1.18
6	Africa	Dem. R. Congo	6.92		Europe	Italy	1.18
7	Africa	Mali	6.89	7	Europe	Estonia	1.19
8	Africa	Western Sahara	6.64	8	Europe	Belarus	1.25
9	Africa	Chad	6.63		Eurasia	Russia	1.25
10	Asia	Gaza Strip	6.55		Europe	Hungary	1.25
		Mean =	6.91			Mean =	1.19
		sd =	.23			sd =	.05

profiles (Europe and the Moslem swathe) is not isolated from the other, and their relationship illustrates a dynamic wherein cultural mosaics with higher fertility will displace or replace cultural mosaics with lower fertility. The dynamic of the cultural inertia of Islam versus the speed of cultural assimilation into Western European life-styles should be interesting to track over generations. See Table 4 for examples of the TFR gap between least and most fecund nations of the world.

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Conclusion

Thus, independent of desirability, intent, plans, plots or conspiracies on the part of political and social leaders, a social dynamic does seem to be in place and operative. To wit: a cultural formula that presents to its women the availability of options that conflict with the mother-role is a cultural formula that is simultaneously non-competitive with the alternative. The reverse of this dynamic is that a cultural formula that presents its women virtually no other role than that of mother is a cultural formula that is competitive and prone to replace alternatives.

In sum, cultural evolution is occurring now, as it has in the past, and as it will in the future. It is argued here that the inertia of this cultural evolution must be with those societies whose women give birth to more children (who survive to maturity). This demographic of "more children" is not evenly or randomly dispersed around the world. There is a strong relationship between restricting women's roles toward motherhood and fertility: more restriction yields higher fertility.

Thus, a cultural dynamic – a feminist paradox – has evolved wherein an increased scope of women's choice in one generation reverberates in a decreased scope of women's choices in subsequent generations. That is, women with low fertility and a broad range of options must be systematically replaced with women of higher fertility and a narrower range of options. And this reduced range of choices is the milieu in which the daughters (as well as the sons) are raised. Accordingly, fertility levels above replacement value will systematically displace or replace fertility levels below replacement value. The only variable to this constant is time: time measured in generations rather than days or years. The three keys to the dynamic are (i) women, when exercising life-style choices wider than the mother role, will often choose a life-style that eventuates in two or fewer children per women, (ii) regardless of the life-style any individual leads, the individual will eventually die, and (iii) children are heavily influenced by their parents as they – the children – are socialized to independence. Women with more children will simply have greater influence on the next generation than women with fewer children. Given these three keys, it must be the case that – across generations – those cultural traditions that strive for gender equality or equity are under systematic pressure to be supplanted by those cultural traditions that

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wedge women into a worldview that strongly emphasizes the mother role at the expense of alternative roles. To date, no socio-cultural formula has been instituted, or is at least easily findable, that results both in equal opportunity by gender and population replacement value or higher.

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Appendix

Citations for characteristics of religious denominations in reference to gender complementarity vis-a-vis gender egalitarianism

Citations more biased toward:	*Denomination:*	*Citation:*
Gender Complementarity	Old Order Amish	Driedger 1988, Hostetler 1980, Kraybill 1993, 1994, Kraybill & Olshan 1994, Nonaka, Miura & Peter 1994, Nonaka, Miura & Peter 1994, Olshan & Schmidt 1994, Umble 1994, 1996, Wasao & Donnermeyer 1996.
	Hutterite Brethren	Hostetler 1983, Nonaka, Miura & Peter 1994 Peter 1987, Van den Berghe & Peter 1988
	Latter Day Saints	Gallup & Castelli 1989, Kosmin & Lachman 1993. Mormon Gospel Principles 1978
	Mennonites	Bush 1998, Chalfant, Beckley & Palmer 1994, Driedger 1988
	Conservative (Hasidic) Judaism	Belcove-Shalin 1995, Dershowitz, 1997, El-Or 1995, Landau 1993, Melton 1993, Rabinowicz 1970
Gender Egalitarianism	Episcopalians	Chalfant, Beckley & Palmer 1994, Gallup & Castelli 1989, Kosmin & Lachman 1993
	(Reform) Judaism	Gallup & Castelli 1989, Jacobson 1995, Kosmin & Lachman 1993,
	Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Mead 1995, Melton 1993
	Lutherans	Chalfant, Beckley & Palmer 1994, Gallup & Castelli 1989, Kosmin & Lachman 1993
	Unitarian-Universalists	Chaves 1997, Mead 1995

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Book Review

The Savage Nation:
Saving America from the Liberal Assault on Our Borders, Language, and Culture
Michael Savage
WND Books, 2002

The "Michael Savage Show" has grown to become one of today's major talk shows in the United States, featured on over 300 stations and heard by between three and five million listeners each week. Michael Savage, the grandson of an immigrant from Russia, is highly educated, with two masters degrees and a Ph.D from the University of California-Berkeley. As with so many others, he has made the switch from a leftward orientation as a young man to what has been described as "independent conservatism."

Despite his education, his appeal to his audience is in his stridency. Conservatives in the United States have long found a considerable appetite among Americans for a "red meat" presentation that points with alarm in a rising crescendo of anger and disillusionment. It is in satisfying this demand that Savage finds his niche. Those of any persuasion who wish to convince others are well advised to welcome voices that will make the appeal at a variety of levels – voices that will carry to the lowest common denominator as well as those that are articulated in nuanced fashion to the most thoughtful. Savage does not attempt to do this.

Savage skillfully selects issues of current importance. He decries the growing decadence and the clamor for false causes; assesses that "our borders, our language, and our culture are under siege"; criticizes the gay rights movement as a "celebration of sodomy," and speaks of feminist fanatics; opposes the "developing mandarin class" that now, as an oligarchy, rules America and finds willing spokesmen in both political parties; and would stop the tax funding of degenerate artists. At the same time he opposes both abortion and the cloning of embryos; supports Israel, and praises Martin Luther King, Jr., as a "great leader of

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the civil rights movement."

There is, however, a fundamentally unrestrained, anti-conservative aspect in his tone, which can only cause more balanced listeners to reject his arguments. His style is replete with such exclamations as "I hated his guts," "Who are these traitors? Every rotten, radical left-winger in this country, that's who"; "the left-wing pinko vermin in high places"; and others too endless to mention. There is no philosophical depth to his argumentation, which is all expletive. Nor is there any civility. Sharp dichotomies between Good and Evil are his stock in trade, as when he says "two Americas are emerging... the Rats and the Eagles."

We live in a time when the divisions within American society are becoming more and more marked. Americans have, indeed, barely begun to see the sources of division, even though it seems the ideological and cultural chasms are already extreme. It is likely that economic displacement, the clashes over the bio-medical revolution (that are likely to make the argument over abortion seem mild in comparison), the animosities that portend to arise out of ethnic balkanization, and the social tearing that will come out of America's newly-affirmed role of world intervention will combine to heighten those divisions far beyond anything Americans now experience.

A paradox is that in this context "civility" looms as both far more essential and far less attainable. If people can't "hear each other out" and remain in civil society with each other, we enter a Hobbesean world of "all against all" – or, unless Americans are very lucky, a time comparable to the first century B.C. in Rome when civil war rent the social fabric and destroyed the Republic. Every breach of civility exacerbates the problem, heating passions and lessening the chance of living together in a social order.

The paradox is further heightened by the fact that the needed civility must not mute the expression of vital opinion. A civility born out of apathy or a flight toward continuing comfort can't face up to the monumental issues that challenge Americans (indeed, all of Western civilization) today. What is imperative is a combination of passion, careful analysis and insight, and (at the same time) a compassionate respect for those one sees as "plainly wrong." Michael Savage is strong

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on the passion; but he is abysmally bad on analysis and civility, and as such denigrates the causes he claims to espouse. If as time passes he were to learn to combine the needed elements, his voice might be more constructively significant than it now is.

Dwight D. Murphey

The Majesty of the Law:
Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor
Random House, 2003

This book by Justice O'Connor will no doubt be enjoyed by many readers as a readable and not very heavy discussion of the United States Supreme Court, highlights of its history and personalities, and personal details about O'Connor's own experiences on the Court as the first woman appointed to it.

At this level, the book must be credited as "recommended reading." It contains a number of worthwhile and instructive elements, such as a history of habeas corpus, of Magna Carta, of the jury system, of the "reporter system" early in the Court's history through which its decisions were published, of the women's movement in the United States, and of the role of the privy council in the colonies before the American Revolution.

O'Connor makes a number of valuable suggestions, say, for improving the jury system, such as that jurors should be allowed to take notes and that it shouldn't automatically disqualify a juror to have heard something about the case. She recommends that jurors should be instructed generally about the law applying the case before they hear the testimony, so that they will have a conceptual framework into which to fit the testimony as they hear it. As a lawyer, I have thought for many years that the courts' failure to give jurors such a road map reflected an odd anti-conceptualism, as though ideas don't count. So I am pleased to see her recommendation.

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There is a deeper reading of *The Majesty of the Law*, however, that makes the book "recommended reading" for a very different reason. Here, the instruction from the book comes from what it tells us about O'Connor's mental landscape and the role she sees for herself as a justice. Those are things very much worth knowing about and pondering carefully.

She was appointed by President Reagan, and therefore started out presumptively as one of the "conservative" justices on the Court. An important fact about the Reagan presidency, however, is that he did a number of things that reflected his being "a man of his time" and that weren't on the mark from the ideological standpoint of his most fervent supporters. One of these was his desire "to be the first to appoint a woman to the Court," even though O'Connor lacked exemplary credentials (having been a trial judge and then a judge on a lower state appellate court).

The fact that stands out most prominently from the book for those who read it more contemplatively is that O'Connor is thoroughly imbued with the worldview that today permeates the educated elite in the United States. Her outlook is a comfortable one, suiting her to a pleasant life on the Court. She is "politically correct" in her support for an egalitarian make-over of American society even if that runs counter to overwhelming public sentiment; she talks much of "democracy" and "democratic process," but it is the democracy of the egalitarian model and not of law and government's being responsive to the existing public will; her heroes in the history of the Court are the "liberal" justices who led the Court away from the old classical liberal construction; she sees Americans as having more freedoms now than they had in the past; and she is enthusiastic about what others speak of as the neo-conservative project to make the United States the leader in "shaping the world" in the image of contemporary American social egalitarianism.

It isn't surprising that she holds this worldview. Most Americans in the broad "elite" made up of the professional classes and the well-placed hold to it.

What is surprising is that O'Connor never gives a moment's thought to what the specifically *Constitutional* basis for incorporating that worldview into the United States' foundational document may be. Oth-

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ers will ask: What business does she have, as a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, to make that vision "the law of the land"? Where does she obtain that power as a judge?

American "liberals" have long argued that the justices of the nineteenth century were illegitimate "activists" when they incorporated a "classical liberal" reading into the Constitution. There are those who would ask whether it was truly "activist" to have construed the Constitution in light of the philosophy that prevailed at the time the Constitution was written and during the first century of the country's existence. There is no doubt that the broad mandates (of the Bill of Rights in particular) need construing. At one time it was common to suggest that a construction in keeping with the original mindset would not be a usurpation and, as such, would not require amendment through the amendatory process that is set out in the Constitution itself. Such a construction would voice the "original intent" (at least in a broad sense as distinguished from a narrow reading).

The reality, of course, is that the Supreme Court of the United States has fashioned itself into a permanently sitting Constitutional convention. Nine lifetime appointees are given, and readily accept, the role of philosopher kings. The irony is that they do so in the name of "democracy" and the "Rule of Law."

A term has come into use that describes the situation well. It speaks of "totalitarian liberalism." O'Connor and the American governing class are for "democratic process," for "women's and minority rights," and for "diversity," all of which seems to them to fit into benign progress toward a better world; but she is able to speak repeatedly of the need to give "unremitting attention" to "pushing the country" and "changing minds everywhere." The Supreme Court is a "teacher," not merely an applier of established law. Americans in the past were "separatist" and illiberal; Americans of the present stand in need of an ongoing refashioning; and Americans of the future will be admirable because they will have become, in effect, a new and enlightened humanity. The vision is "liberalism" of a sort; the "totalitarian" aspect comes from its being in the tradition of the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks, who demanded the molding of humanity as though people were clay.

One would wish that O'Connor would demonstrate some con-

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sciousness of all this. She doesn't. That failure allows her to be well adjusted to the age in which she lives. Self-satisfaction and contentedness are the primary moods of the book.

Dwight D. Murphey

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

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

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